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Notice: Aircraft Lien Law in Florida
TIMOTHY M. RAVICH*
Establishing (e.g., perfecting) and enforcing a lien presents technical pitfalls and practical problems with which
practitioners and courts are often unfamiliar or uncomfortable. After all, the law of liens requires an understanding of
many different areas of the law, including the law of contract, bailment, unjust enrichment, and customary law. But
among the most fraught with uncertainty are mechanic’s
liens, which establish a right in favor of persons—“artisans”—performing or furnishing labor, services, fuel, or
material upon personal property. Florida’s mechanic’s lien
statute raises particularly challenging legal issues as applied to aircraft.
In Florida, the perfection and enforcement of a mechanic’s lien as against an aircraft is rarely plain or intuitive. To get from lien perfection to lien foreclosure, aviation
and commercial law practitioners must travel from Florida’s general mechanic’s lien statute through a mosaic of
other state statutes, including a standalone chapter related
to aviation. Along the way, equitable considerations, like the
need for injunctive relief and the law of replevin and tort
(e.g., conversion), likely come into play. Finally, lienors
must satisfy an exacting federal statutory recording scheme
and navigate a corresponding body of decisional law that
raises thorny issues of federalism, priority, and preemption.
The final tally: Perfection and enforcement of a mechanic’s lien in Florida requires the command of a minimum
of four different Florida statutory chapters that rarely (and
*
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Board Certified Specialist (Aviation Law); and Chair (2008–2010), Florida Bar
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rarely clearly) cross-reference each other, several federal
statutes that frequently have no obvious relationship to state
lien law, and scattered decisional law rendered at every
level of the judiciary. This is to say nothing of the international law regime governing the registration of airplanes
and airplane parts or the likelihood that an aircraft may already be encumbered by the lien or priority mechanisms of
another state or states.
But the most problematic aspect of Florida’s statutory
regime for mechanic’s liens, which is at the center of this
Article, is the role possession plays in perfecting aircraft
liens. Possession typically plays a decisive role in the area
of lien law, animating the common law tenet that “possession is nine points of the law.” For more than a decade, however, Florida statutory law has presented an internally conflicted path toward lien perfection by also providing that
possession is unnecessary. That is, under Florida law, a
valid lien also could be created simply by recording a claim
of lien. Recently, however, the Florida Legislature amended
chapter 329, Florida Statutes, to clarify that possession is
not required for lien perfection purposes; notice alone now
suffices.
This Article discusses the possession versus notice problem inherent in the state’s statutory scheme and then analyzes the recent change to the law. In doing so, this Article
evaluates the advantages and disadvantages of Florida’s
“new” mechanism for the perfection and enforcement of mechanic’s lien on aircraft, and argues in favor a statutory
scheme that once and for all takes aircraft outside of Florida’s general mechanic’s lien statute, situating the subject of
aircraft liens in a legal scheme that comprehensively provides for the perfection and enforcement of aircraft-specific
artisan liens. Finally, this Article provides a comprehensive
empirical review of the mechanic’s lien laws of every state
in order to broadly contextualize how legislatures and courts
around the nation approach the issue of perfection and notice for lien perfection purposes. In all, this Article’s relevance is greatest for aviation practitioners and courts adjudicating aviation liens in Florida and elsewhere, but it may
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also hold interest for a wider audience seeking to achieve
efficiencies in the interpretation and application of commercial and secured transactions concerning personal property
and mobile assets in analogous situations.
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INTRODUCTION
In substance and form, liens are not conceptually difficult to understand. Liens are claims against property that evidence a debt, obligation, or duty.1 Liens arise either consensually, as by agreement,
or non-consensually, as by judgment,2 equity,3 or statute.4 They are
usually effected by filing a verified itemized account of the demand
due according to the relevant state or federal authority.5 In application, however, the process of establishing (e.g., perfecting) and enforcing a lien presents technical pitfalls and practical problems with
which practitioners and courts are often unfamiliar or uncomfortable. After all, the law of liens requires an understanding of many
different areas of the law, including the law of contract, bailment,
unjust enrichment, and customary law.6 In addition, liens exist in
favor of countless kinds of private and public creditors—from home
mortgage lenders, to municipalities, to the Internal Revenue Service.7 But among the most fraught with uncertainty are mechanic’s
liens, which establish a right in favor of persons—“artisans”—performing or furnishing labor, services, fuel, or material upon personal
property.8
1

34 FLA. JUR. 2d Liens § 1 (2014).
William W. Kannel & Ericm R. Blythe, Statutor Liens vs. Consensual
Liens: Why It Matters and When It May Not, NAT’L L. REV. (Mar. 18, 2016),
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/statutory-liens-vs-consensual-liens-whyit-matters-and-when-it-may-not.
3
See Ralph E. Boyer & Barry Kutun, The Equitable Lien in Florida, 20 U.
MIA. L. REV. 731, 731 (1966).
4
FLA. JUR. 2d Liens §12 (2014).
5
See Michael Scott, Liens in Aircraft: Priorities, 25 J. AIR L. & COM. 193,
196–97 (1959).
6
See, e.g., Lake River Corp. v. Carbordum Co., 769 F.2d 1284, 1287 (7th
Cir. 1985) (“[A] lien is . . . a device for preventing unjust enrichment . . . .”).
7
See Justin Pritchard, Liens: What They Are and How They Work, BALANCE
(July 29, 2020), https://www.thebalance.com/liens-what-they-are-and-how-theywork-315611 (discussing different kinds of liens).
8
See Mark Sauer, Ohio’s New and Improved Mechanic’s Lien Statutes: In
Pursuit of Legitimacy, 22 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 895, 895–97 (1996) (describing mechanic’s liens and explaining why the law of mechanic’s liens have become “increasingly complicated”); 2 RAYMOND T. NIMMER & DAVID OLIVEIRI, NIMMER’S
COMMERCIAL ASSET-BASED FINANCING § 16:45 (2020) (using the terms “artisan’s liens” and “mechanic’s liens” interchangeably).
2
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Florida’s mechanic’s lien statute raises particularly challenging
legal issues as applied to aircraft. In Florida, the perfection and enforcement of a mechanic’s lien as against an aircraft is rarely plain
or intuitive. This is unexpected given how seemingly clear the operative mechanic’s lien statute appears on its face. Section 713.58,
Florida Statutes, establishes a general lien “[i]n favor of persons performing labor or services for any other person, upon the personal
property of the latter upon which the labor or services is performed.”9 Part of the confusion is that, so far as liens on aircraft are
concerned, section 713.58 is a starting point rather than a destination.
Indeed, to get from lien perfection to lien foreclosure, aviation
and commercial law practitioners must travel from Florida’s general
mechanic’s lien statute through a mosaic of other state statutes, including a standalone chapter related to aviation.10 Section 329.51 of
that chapter provides that any lien claimed on an aircraft pursuant to
Florida’s general law mechanic’s lien, section 713.58, “is enforceable when the lienor records a verified lien notice with the clerk of
the circuit court where the aircraft was located at the time the labor,
services, fuel, or material was last furnished.”11 Florida law then requires practitioners and courts to jump to section 85.011, Florida
Statutes, which governs the enforcement of all statutory liens.12
Along the way, equitable considerations, like the need for injunctive
relief and the law of replevin and tort (e.g., conversion), likely come
into play. Finally, lienors must satisfy an exacting federal statutory
recording scheme and navigate a corresponding body of decisional
law that raises thorny issues of federalism, priority, and preemption.13
The final tally: Perfection and enforcement of a mechanic’s lien
in Florida requires the command of a minimum of four different
9

FLA. STAT. § 713.58(1) (2020).
See FLA. STAT. §§ 329.01–329.51 (2020).
11
FLA. STAT. § 329.51 (2020); see also FLA. STAT. § 329.41 (2020) (providing that liens for fuel furnished to aircraft are “enforceable in the same manner as
provided in [section] 329.51”).
12
FLA. STAT. § 85.011 (2020).
13
See Robert C. Newark, III, 60 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 708, 710–11
(2006) (discussing Carolina Aircraft Corp. v. Commerce Tr. Co., 289 So. 2d 37,
38 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974), where both state laws and Federal Aviation Administration (“FAA”) regulations were at issue).
10
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Florida statutory chapters that rarely (and rarely clearly) cross-reference each other (Chapters 78, 85, 329, and 713), several federal
statutes that frequently have no obvious relationship to state lien
law, and scattered decisional law rendered at every level of the judiciary. This is to say nothing of the international law regime governing the registration of airplanes and airplane parts14 or the likelihood that an aircraft may already be encumbered by the lien or priority mechanisms of another state or states.15 In all, navigating
through the maze of lien laws at the state, national, and international
levels is challenging and leads to administrative and practical inefficiencies. To be sure, these challenges are surmountable. However,
they serve as important background for an even larger substantive
concern that has long troubled Florida practitioners and courts, and
which is at the center of this Article: What role does possession play
in perfecting aircraft liens under Florida law?
Ostensibly, the answer is that possession plays not only an important role, but also a decisive one. After all, the adage that “possession is nine points of the law” is a basic tenet of the common law,
and its animating idea—that the exercise of rights frequently rises
and falls with possession—is beyond doubt in common law legal
systems around the world.16 Every court to have considered Florida’s general mechanic’s lien law, in fact, has recognized that possession is the sine qua non of the lien17—an understanding that dates
back at least to the times of medieval lawyers in whose eyes “[p]ossession largely usurped not only the substance but the name of Property.”18 Florida’s general mechanic’s lien law has coincided with the
14

See Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment, art. 2,
Nov. 16, 2001, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 108–10 (2003). This Article focuses on liens
on aircraft as opposed to liens on aircraft subcomponents or ancillaries, such as
avionics and engines. Perfection and enforcement of liens on such aircraft parts is
an area of the law unto itself. See, e.g., In re S. Air Transp., Inc., 255 B.R. 715,
718 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2000) (evaluating whether Florida’s statutory lien scheme
applies to spare aircraft parts).
15
See infra Appendix.
16
See OXFORD DICTIONARY OF PROVERBS 245 (Jennifer Speake ed., 2015)
(citing THOMAS DRAXE, BIBLIOTHECA SCHOLASTICA INSTRUCTISSIMA 163
(1616)); FREDERICK POLLOCK & ROBERT SAMUEL WRIGHT, AN ESSAY ON
POSSESSION IN THE COMMON LAW 1 (1888).
17
See, e.g., In re Garland Corp., 6 B.R. 452, 454 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1980).
18
POLLOCK & WRIGHT, supra note 16, at 5.

2021]

NOTICE: AIRCRAFT LIEN LAW IN FLORIDA

1123

common law in this regard by virtue of being inseparably connected
with possession and the view that “the right of the creditor to retain
the possession of the article, created or enhanced in value by his labor, [endures] till the compensation due for his labor thereon was
paid.”19 This deeply engrained and universal concept—that perfection (and to a lesser extent, enforcement) of a lien go hand-in-hand
with possession of the personal property upon which an artisan provides labor or services—applies almost automatically to just about
every one of the more than two dozen mechanic’s liens recognized
under Florida law.20 But in the context of aircraft liens, turbulence
best explains the relationship between possession and perfection.
The title and body of Chapter 329, Florida Statutes, reveals why
this is so. Until recently, section 329.51 provided:
329.51 Liens for labor, services, fuel, or material expended upon aircraft; notice.
Any lien claimed on an aircraft under [section] 329.4121 or [section] 713.5822 is enforceable
when the lienor records a verified lien notice with the
clerk of the circuit court in the county where the aircraft was located at the time the labor, services, fuel,
or material was last furnished. The lienor must record
such lien notice within [ninety] days after the time
the labor, services, fuel, or material was last furnished. The notice must state the name of the lienor;
the name of the owner; a description of the aircraft
upon which the lienor has expended labor, services,
fuel, or material; the amount for which the lien is
claimed; and the date the expenditure was completed.
This section does not affect the priority of competing

19

N.C. Manson, Jr., Note, Mechanics’ Liens, 2 VA. L. REG. 489, 489 (1896).
See generally FLA. STAT. §§ 713.001– .37 (2020) (construction liens).
21
FLA. STAT. § 329.41 (2017) (lien for fuel furnished to aircraft) (“A person
who has furnished fuel to an aircraft has a lien upon the aircraft for any unpaid
fuel charges. The lien is enforceable in the same manner as provided in [section]
329.51.”).
22
FLA. STAT. § 713.58 (2017) (liens for labor or services on personal property).
20
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interests in any aircraft or the lienor’s obligation to
record the lien under [section] 329.01.23
In 2010, in Commercial Jet, Inc. v. U.S. Bank, N.A,24 Florida’s
Third District Court of Appeal rejected an argument that this statutory language amended section 713.58 by providing that a valid lien
can be created simply by recording a claim of lien within ninety
days.25 “[S]ection 329.51 does not create any new lien rights,” the
court held; “[i]nstead, it is manifestly a notice statute, as is apparent
by its title” and the fact that the statute specifically states that it applies to liens that are possessory in nature, for example, “[a]ny lien
claimed on an aircraft under [section] 329.41 or [section] 713.58.”26
This rationale effectively rendered section 329.51 of no effect
whatever, creating genuine confusion among maintenance, repair,
and overhaul (“MRO”) providers and their counsel.27 If possession
was all that mattered under Commercial Jet, Inc., then was notice
under 329.51 still required? Stated otherwise, was possession alone
sufficient to perfect a lien such that an MRO could perfect a mechanic’s lien without also satisfying the notice and recordation provisions of section 329.51? If so, what purpose did section 329.51
serve, if any?
Commercial Jet, Inc. raised rather than resolved these and other
elementary legal and practical questions, yet the case endured as
precedent for almost a decade. In 2019, however, the Florida Legislature amended Chapter 329, Florida Statutes, to clarify that possession is not required for purposes of perfecting a mechanic’s lien

23

FLA. STAT. § 329.51 (2017); see also infra Part III.
Com. Jet, Inc. v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 45 So. 3d 887 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
25
Id. at 888.
26
Id. (emphasis added).
27
This confusion was articulated by Judge Schwartz who issued a dissenting
opinion. Id. at 889 (Scwartz, J., dissenting) (“The majority holding that [section
329.51] did not have the effect specifically provided by the legislature is in conflict with just about every canon of legislative interpretation there is . . . . [A] statute dealing with a specific subject, such as aircraft, must be deemed to control
over a general one such as section 713.58.”).
24
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under state law.28 Notice alone suffices.29 In doing so, the Legislature validated the dissenting opinion in Commercial Jet, Inc., which
rebutted the majority’s decision as producing “conflict with just
about every cannon of legislative interpretation there is.”30
This Article evaluates the possession versus notice problem inherent in a statutory scheme that effectively required the near contemporaneous application of Florida’s possession-centric general
mechanic’s lien law (section 713.58) alongside Florida’s aviationspecific and notice-only law (section 329.51) in favor of artisans
who provide labor, service, fuel, or material upon aircraft. To frame
this discussion, Part I explains why and how the possession versus
notice problem is unusual when compared to other statutory lien
schemes and yet unremarkable (albeit unique) when measured
against the manner by which the law has historically treated an aircraft as an asset. Part II then describes the statutory and decisional
law in Florida respecting aviation liens, tracking the universe of decisions on the matter.31 Following a review of these court opinions,
Part III analyzes the advantages and disadvantages of Florida’s
“new” mechanism for the perfection and enforcement of mechanic’s
lien on aircraft, arguing in favor of a statutory scheme that once and
28

H.B. 975, 2019 Leg., 88th Sess. (Fla. 2019) (“An act relating to aircraft
liens; amending [sections] 329.41 and 329.51 specifying that a lienor is not required to possess an aircraft to perfect certain liens . . . .”).
29
FLA. STAT. § 329.51 (2020).
30
Com. Jet, Inc., 45 So. 3d at 889 (Schwartz, J., dissenting); see also CIV.
JUST. COMM., FINAL BILL ANALYSIS, H.B. 975, 1st Sess., at 4 (Fla. 2019)
https://www.flsenate.gov/Session/Bill/2019/975/Analyses/h0975z1.CJS.PDF
(“The bill declares liens claimed under [sections] 329.41 and 713.58 for labor,
services, fuel, or material furnished to an aircraft are not possessory liens. Thus,
a person claiming such a lien does not need to keep the aircraft in his or her possession to enforce the lien.”).
31
See infra Part II. A search of all Florida decisions arising under section
713.58 over a 133-year period produced a modest set of cases—between twenty
and thirty cases in all. The first decision was rendered in 1901, First National
Bank v. Kirkby, 32 So. 881 (Fla. 1901), and the most recent was decided in 2019,
J.V. Air Maintenance, Inc. v. Westward Leasing, Corp., 283 So. 3d 379 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 2019). Only seven of these decisions centered on section 329.51. See,
e.g., Glob. Xtreme, Inc. v. Advanced Aircraft Ctr., Inc., 122 So. 3d 487, 491 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2013). Just four cases examined section 329.41 in a substantive
way, for example, Commercial Jet, Inc., and only four of the cases related to aircraft, see for example, In re Tradewinds Airlines, Inc., 394 B.R. 614, 616–18
(Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2008).
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for all takes aircraft outside of Florida’s general mechanic’s lien
statute and situates the subject of aircraft liens in a legal scheme that
comprehensively provides for the perfection and enforcement of aircraft-specific artisan liens. In all, this Article’s relevance is greatest
for aviation practitioners and courts adjudicating aviation liens, but
it may also hold interest for a broader audience seeking to achieve
efficiencies in the interpretation and application of commercial and
secured transactions concerning mobile personal property in analogous situations.
I.
PRIORITY, POSSESSION, AND PRECEDENT
This section contextualizes the specific discussion of the possession versus notice problem for mechanic’s lien purposes within the
broader context of how courts have struggled to fit aircraft within
traditional notions of property law. Understanding how and why the
law regards airplanes as an exceptional asset may help to explain
how the dilemma of possession versus notice emerged in the first
place.
As an initial matter, little precedent exists so far as aircraft liens
are concerned. Indeed, the history of security interests in aircraft is
as brief as it is muddled. One obvious explanation for this is that,
until relatively recently, aircraft were unimaginable or unknown—
or at least unrecognized—as a category of chattel under the law.32
Consequently, controversies about the perfection and enforcement
of liens against aircraft simply did not arise under the common law
until the last century.33 In fact, airplane ownership and use presented
no judiciable issue until the 1910s, and even then, practitioners and
courts had to develop the subject matter of aviation lien law on a
blank slate with, at best, reference to and reliance on imperfectly
persuasive precedent established in other legal contexts.34
32

The earliest court opinions mentioning airplanes date back to approximately the early 1900s. See, e.g., Wright Co. v. Herrin-Curtiss Co., 204 F. 597,
597 (W.D.N.Y. 1913) (describing Orville and Wilbur Wright’s 1906 patent for
“improvements in flying machines, or in other words, for a structure commonly
known as an aeroplane”).
33
See id.
34
See Scott, supra note 5, at 193–96; Note, Aeroplanes and Admiralty, 28
HARV. L. REV. 200, 200 (1914).
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In the 1914 case of Crawford Bros. No. 2, for example—possibly the earliest tort case involving aircraft—a federal court declined
to impose a maritime lien for repairs to an airplane because the judge
was at a loss as to whether and how to characterize an airplane as a
maritime vessel for jurisdictional purposes:35
In view of the novelty and complexity of the questions that must necessarily arise out of this new engine of transportation and commerce, it appears to
the court that, in the absence of legislation conferring
jurisdiction, none would obtain in this court, and that
questions such as those raised by the libelant must be
relegated to the common-law courts, courts of general jurisdiction. [L]egislation is necessary for the
regulation of air craft. They are neither of the land
nor sea, and, not being of the sea or restricted in
their activities to navigable waters, they are not maritime.36
The court’s uncertainty about how to extend jurisdiction to an
asset that is “neither of the land nor sea”37 has become a hallmark of
modern aviation law and aviation lien law specifically.38 As such,
and in the absence of binding law, practitioners and courts frequently draw from two legal frameworks, the common law and maritime law.39
First, under the common law, the maxim qui prior est tempore
potior est jure—he who is first prior in time is prior in right (or equity)—applies to two liens of the same nature or class.40 In addition

35

See Crawford Bros. No. 2, 215 F. 269, 270–71 (W.D. Wash. 1914).
Id. at 271 (emphasis added); see also Aeroplanes and Admiralty, supra
note 34, at 200 (“There are certain considerations which lend a measure of superficial plausibility to the contention that an aeroplane might be made subject to a
maritime lien for repairs.”).
37
Crawford Bros., 215 F. at 271.
38
See, e.g., 14AA CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 3679 (4th ed. Supp. 2020) (“The question of whether torts involving airplane crashes in navigable waters are cognizable in admiralty has plagued
federal courts for almost as long as airplanes have been in existence.”).
39
See Scott, supra note 5, at 193.
40
Id. at 194.
36

1128

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75:1117

to this time-sequence for priority, courts recognize the generally superior position of the common law lien.41
Conversely, under maritime law, priority among liens is determined in the inverse order of their creation such that later liens take
precedence over all earlier liens.42 This ancient anomaly reflected
two policy choices. First, “a maritime lien converts the vessel itself
into the obligor and allows injured parties to proceed against it directly” in an in rem proceeding.43 As such, each lienor performing
services for a vessel acquired some proprietary value in the vessel;
he “acquires a jus in re, and becomes a sort of coproprietor in the res
and . . . subjects his claim to the next similar line which attaches.”44
Second, maritime law ranks the last lienor to perform services on a
vessel as the senior lienholder because “the last beneficial service is
the one that continues the activity of the ship as long as possible”45
and doing so inures to the benefit of all earlier lienors.46
In all, both the common law and maritime law are helpful for
conceptualizing artisan’s liens applicable to aircraft, but neither
translates precisely to aircraft liens, in large measure because the
common law and maritime law offer divergent and “competing analogies” on important issues of lien priority, perfection, and enforcement.47
Aviation lien law thus confusingly reflects ideas from the two
competing priority schemes posited by the common law and maritime traditions. Stated otherwise, aviation lien law falls somewhere
between the maritime concept of proceeding in rem and the common
law’s recognition of the superior position of the artisan who files his
claim first in time. Notwithstanding that common law liens and
41
42
43

See id.
Id. at 194–95.
Crimson Yachts v. Betty Lyn II Motor Yacht, 603 F.3d 864, 868 (11th Cir.

2010).
44

The William Leishear, 21 F.2d 862, 863 (D. Md. 1927).
Id.
46
Id. (“[B]eneficial additions subsequent to earlier liens add to the value of
the ship, and that, therefore, to prefer such additions will not deprive the earlier
lienors of any interest which they would have had, if no such services had been
rendered.”); see also Roger G. Connor, Maritime Lien Priorities: Cross-Currents
of Theory, 54 MICH. L. REV. 777, 779–83 (1956) (discussing “property” and “benefit” theories of liens).
47
See Scott, supra note 5, at 193.
45
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maritime lien concepts are theoretically (if not logically) impossible,
the ideas from each are enduringly compelling given the resemblances between vessels and aircraft:
Obviously, the fact that most airplanes today are
chattels of considerable value means that long-term
financing by mortgage or conditional sale will be
necessary, as in the case of land purchase. Thus the
common law priority problems involving secured
holders and the later lienors immediately become
pertinent. On the other hand, a similarity between the
aircraft and the ship as a mode of conveyance will
often mean that the same transactions which traditionally are recognized as giving a maritime lien may
also be the basis for a lien in aircraft.48
Indeed, both the common law and maritime law have merits as
applied to aviation and each has retained relevance even in jurisdictions in which liens are purely statutory in nature.49 This is particularly so where “priority legislation with respect to the aircraft is infrequent and incomplete, so that resort to these or other principles
outside the statute may well be necessary.”50 In all, while reflecting
generally on how the common law and maritime law approach the
issue of lien priority may not squarely resolve issues unique to airplanes, it helpfully illustrates and explains the paradoxical strands
that inform modern aircraft lien laws.
So, too, does an understanding of the ways in which the common
law and maritime law address the issue of possession provide important background about the policy decisions underlying contemporary aviation lien laws. After all, before a lienor can claim priority
he must perfect his lien.51 Possession is the traditional mechanism.52
Yet, in this regard, too, the common law and maritime law diverge.
Liens at common law conferred “the mere right to retain possession
of some chattel until a debt or demand due the person thus retaining
48

Id. at 196.
Id. at 193.
50
Id. at 194.
51
See 68A AM. JUR. 2D. Secured Transactions § 216 (2021).
52
See id. § 336 (describing perfection by possession under Uniform Commercial Code).
49

1130

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75:1117

it is satisfied; possession being such a necessary element that if it is
voluntarily surrendered by the creditor the lien is at once extinguished.”53 Maritime law advances a different rule: liens may exist
without possession of the thing upon which it is asserted, either actually or constructively.54 The aviation lien laws of every state fall
within one or the other of these philosophies—and sometimes,
somehow, both.55
The crucial importance of possession in the context of aviation
liens is explicable—obvious, even—given the mobility of airplanes
and the relatively easy transferability of airplane parts like engines
and avionics on a global scale.56 Airplanes often are flown to other
states for repair, storage, and maintenance and the risk that a debtor
might abscond with collateral is not merely hypothetical.57 The
chance that a debtor will fly an airplane beyond the jurisdiction of a
court authorized to issue a judgment of foreclosure, or out of the
reach of financiers, lessors, owners, and creditors seeking repossession, clouds nearly every aviation lien foreclosure case, moreover.58
This perhaps explains the draw of shows like Discovery Channel’s
Airplane Repo, which dramatized bank repossessions of high-end
luxury assets from individuals behind on their payments.59
In any case, the flight risks inherent in aviation both mitigate for
and against lien regimes that confer lienors with possessory rights.
53

Jones v. Carpenter, 106 So. 127, 129 (Fla. 1925).
The Rock Island Bridge, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 213, 215 (1867); see also The
Lottawanna, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 558, 598 (1874) (“[C]ommon-law liens are always connected with the possession of the thing and are lost when the possession
is relinquished. On the other hand a maritime lien does not in any manner depend
upon the possession, as it is a right affecting the thing itself, which gives a proprietary interest in it and a right to proceed against it to recover that interest.”).
55
See infra Appendix.
56
See supra, note 14.
57
The flight risk of mobile aviation assets is significant enough that, in 2001,
some seventy-seven nations as well as the European Union signed an international
treaty and legal framework—the “Cape Town Convention”—to standardize transactions and registration of movable property. See Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment, supra note 14, at art. 3.
58
Florida law does recognize the risk of unlawful removal of property upon
which a lien has accrued in other contexts, including liens for hotels. See, e.g.,
FLA. STAT. § 713.69 (2020).
59
Airplane Repo, DISCOVERY, https://www.discovery.com/shows/airplanerepo (last visited May 15, 2021).
54
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For example, normatively, the law should disallow any possessory
rights in favor of a lienor whose claim is based on an inflated, fraudulent, or otherwise materially defective invoice.60 Oppositely, by allowing a legitimately aggrieved lienor to retain possession of a
debtor’s airplane for some amount of time, the law creates appropriate leverage for an artisan and incentives for a debtor to resolve their
dispute.61 But, of course, knowing whether a creditor rightly contested or refused to pay an artisan for labor or services or whether a
lienor was jilted by an unsavory airplane owner cannot be known
ahead of time. All this said, allowing a creditor to take back possession of its aircraft may encourage the settlement of any debt by allowing the creditor to put its aircraft back into revenue-generating
service.
In the foregoing context, Florida law has tried to achieve a balance by allowing a lienor under Florida’s general mechanic’s lien
statute (section 713.58) to retain possession of an aircraft for three
months “if the person was in possession at the time the lien attached.”62 At the same time, the enforceability of a mechanic’s lien
seems to turn not on possession but merely on whether a lienor has
provided notice of his claim of lien.63 Whether to perfect an aviation
lien by way of possession, or notice, or both, has confounded courts
and practitioners for at least a decade.64 The following Part addresses the tortured way in which litigants and courts have addressed
this question and how the Legislature resolved it (mostly).
II.
POSSESSORY LIEN + NOTICE = PERFECTION?
Perfecting and enforcing a lien on an aircraft under Florida law
is sometimes a complicated mess. To do so, practitioners must harmonize at least four different statutory chapters that do not cohesively relate to the state’s various mechanic’s lien statutes.65
60

See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 713.31 (2020) (remedies in case of fraud or collu-

sion).
61

See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 85.011(1) (2020) (addressing retention of possession of property that has a lien attached).
62
Id.
63
See FLA. STAT. § 329.51 (2020).
64
See infra Part II.
65
See FLA. STAT. chs. 78, 85, 329, 713 (2020).
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Additionally, federal law establishes notice and recording requirements for aircraft liens that are themselves rift with pitfalls.66 And,
even if all of the elements for perfection at the state and federal level
are satisfied with absolute precision and coordination, Florida law
provides no fewer than five methods for enforcement, including an
action in chancery, an action at law, a special action at law, a summary action, and retention of possession.67
Be that as it may, Title XL of the Florida Statutes is the starting
point for creditors prosecuting a lien.68 Relating to real and personal
property, it sets out the state’s general statutory framework for
liens.69 It does so in four parts, each of which corresponds to a particular category of lien.70 For example, Part I is known as Florida’s
Construction Lien Law.71 While that law is not free from ambiguity
or controversy, it nevertheless presents substantial guidance for lienors.72 Set out across more than thirty discrete statutory sections,
Florida’s Construction Lien Law details nearly every aspect of how
to perfect and enforce a construction lien—from how to commence
and terminate a lien to how to assign, waive, or release a construction lien, and even how to seek attorneys’ fees in an action to enforce
a construction lien or to enforce a claim against a bond.73
In contrast, guidance for aviation liens is comparatively bareboned, coming in the form of Part II of Title XL of the Florida Statutes—a catch-all statutory section entitled “Miscellaneous Liens.”74
Under this heading are an unrelated assortment of liens, including

66

See 49 U.S.C. §§ 44107–08.
FLA. STAT. § 85.011 (2020).
68
See FLA. STAT. chs. 689–723 (2020).
69
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ch. 713 (2020) (entitled “Liens, generally”).
70
See id. (including the following parts: Construction Liens, Miscellaneous
Liens, Oil and Gas Liens, and the Florida Uniform Federal Lien Registration Act).
71
FLA. STAT. §§ 713.001–.37 (2020).
72
E.g., Leonard Klingen, Florida’s Unwieldy but Effective Construction Lien
Law, 93 FLA. BAR J. 27, 27 (2019) (“Construction liens are certainly among the
most common. They are also among the most Byzantine, and the complexity of
their governing statute, Part I of Chapter 713, is testament to the difficulty of balancing common law contract principles with the realities of the construction marketplace.”).
73
See FLA. STAT. §§ 713.001–.37 (2020).
74
FLA. STAT. §§ 713.50–.79.l (2020).
67
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molder’s liens,75 liens for labor or services in ginning cotton,76 liens
related to animal feed and veterinarians,77 and liens for hotels78 and
interior decorators.79 Part II does not address aviation liens specifically. Rather, aviation practitioners have prosecuted and defended
mechanic’s liens on the basis of the broad language of section
713.58, Florida Statutes, which affords a lien “[i]n favor of persons
performing labor or services for any other person, upon the personal
property of the latter upon which the labor or services is performed.”80
Importantly, case law has universally construed liens created under section 713.58, Florida Statutes, as possessory in nature, existing only as long as the person entitled to the lien retains possession
of the property upon which the lien was claimed.81 As Florida’s
Third District Court of Appeal stated in an aviation lien foreclosure
action, this statute explicitly provides that “the possessory right and
lien of the person performing labor or services under this section is
released, relinquished, and lost by the removal of such property.”82
Florida statutory law also explicitly prescribes “retention of possession” as condition of enforcement of a section 713.58 mechanic’s
lien.83 Specifically, section 85.011, Florida Statutes, allows a lienor
who furnishes labor, services, fuel, or material upon aircraft to retain
possession of an aircraft upon which a lien has accrued for three

75

FLA. STAT. § 713.596 (2020).
FLA. STAT. § 713.595 (2020).
77
FLA. STAT. §§ 713.655–.66 (2020).
78
FLA. STAT. §§ 1713.67–68 (2020).
79
FLA. STAT. § 713.79 (2020).
80
FLA. STAT. § 713.58(1) (2020).
81
Despite its obvious importance, “[p]ossessory lien” is defined only once in
the Florida Statutes, under the state’s adaption of the Uniform Commercial Code:
Section 679.333 addresses the perfection of certain liens arising by operation of
law and defines “possessory lien” to mean “an interest . . . [w]hich secures payment or performance of an obligation for services or materials furnished with respect to goods by a person in the ordinary course of the person’s business[,] . . . [w]hich is created by statute or rule of law in favor of the person[,]
and . . . [t]he effectiveness of which depends on the person’s possession of the
goods.” FLA. STAT. § 679.333 (2020) (emphasis added).
82
See Com. Jet, Inc. v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 45 So. 3d 887, 888 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2010) (quoting FLA. STAT. § 713.58(3) (2009)).
83
FLA. STAT. § 85.011(1) (2020).
76
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months.84 Crucially, however, under the plain terms of this statute,
a repairman’s right to so retain possession exists only “if the [lienor]
was in possession [of the aircraft] at the time the lien attached.”85
Curiously, whereas the perfection and enforcement of Florida’s
general law concerning liens over personal property under sections
85.011 and 713.58, Florida Statutes, turn on possession (albeit only
for three months), the statutory regime tailored explicitly to aviation
liens (Title XXV of the Florida Statutes) identifies notice, not possession, as the sine que non of lien perfection.86 In fact, section
329.51, Florida Statutes, titled “Liens for labor, services, fuel, or
material expended upon aircraft; notice,” provides that an aircraft
lien is enforceable upon the recordation of a claim of lien within
ninety days of the services rendered: “Any lien claimed on an aircraft under . . . [section] 713.58 is enforceable when the lienor records a verified lien notice with the clerk of the circuit court in the
county where the aircraft was located at the time the labor, services,
fuel, or material was last furnished.”87 Thus, apart from its reference
to Florida’s possessory mechanic’s lien under section 713.58—a
reference that has generated enormous confusion—the concept of
possession is noticeably absent from section 329.51.
For that matter, section 329.51 contemplates a two-step process
to perfect a lien—neither of which requires possession.88 First, the
statute requires a lienor to file a verified notice of lien with the clerk
of the circuit court in the county in which the aircraft was located at
the time the labor, services, fuel, or material was last furnished in
order for the lien to be enforceable against the owner of the
84

Id.
Id; see also Ocala Foundry & Mach. Works v. Lester, 38 So. 51, 54 (Fla.
1905) (“[The mechanic’s right to retain possession] was not the rule of the common law, but it is the rule under the statute, which expressly limits the right of
possession to a period not exceeding three months.”). Therefore, “when possession has been held for a period of three months the mechanic or laborer has no
right under the statute to longer retain the property as against the consent of the
debtor.” Id.; see also Assocs. Com. Corp. v. Ross, 465 So. 2d 663, 665 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1985) (reiterating the language in Ocala Foundry); E. Airlines Emps.
Fed. Credit Union v. Lauderdale Yacht Basin, Inc., 334 So. 2d 175, 177 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1976) (relying on language of section 713.58).
86
See FLA. STAT. § 329.51 (2020).
87
Id.
88
See id.
85
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aircraft.89 Second, pursuant to section 329.01,Florida Statutes (“Recording instruments affecting civil aircraft”), a lienor is required to
record notice of its lien in the office of the Federal Aviation Administrator of the United States:
No instrument which affects the title to or interest in
any civil aircraft of the United States, or any portion
thereof, is valid in respect to such aircraft, or portion
thereof, against any person, other than the person by
whom the instrument is made or given, the person’s
heirs or devisee, and any person having actual notice
thereof, until such instrument is recorded in the office of the Federal Aviation Administrator of the
United States, or such other office as is designated by
the laws of the United States as the one in which such
instruments should be filed. Every such instrument
so recorded in such office is valid as to all persons
without further recordation in any office of this state.
Any instrument required to be recorded by the provisions of this section takes effect from the date of its
recordation and not from the date of its execution. 90
Federal law thus works in tandem with Florida lien law. Pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 44108, until an instrument executed for security
purposes is filed for recording with the Federal Aviation Administration (“FAA”), the instrument is valid only against the person
making the instrument and not against any other person or entity.91
In this regard, the determination of enforceability of a mechanic’s
lien under Florida law is distinct from the determination of validity

89

Id. The statute requires a lienor to record such lien notice within ninety
days after the time labor, services, fuel, or material was last furnished. Id. In addition, the statute mandates that the notice of lien contains certain information:
“the name of the lienor; the name of the owner; a description of the aircraft upon
which the lienor had expended labor, services, fuel, or material; the amount for
which the lien was claimed; and the date the expenditure was completed.” Id.
90
FLA. STAT. § 329.01 (emphasis added); see also 49 U.S.C. §§ 44107–08.
91
See, e.g., Creston Aviation, Inc. v. Textron Fin. Corp., 900 So. 2d 727, 729,
731 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (finding that a statutory lien against an aircraft was
unenforceable when mechanic filed notice of lien with the FAA but not in the
county where labor or services were last performed on aircraft).
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of the lien against third parties and the priority of the lien against
competing lien interests:
Therefore, once a party asserting a mechanic’s lien
files a verified notice of lien in the county in which
it last provided services upon an aircraft, the notice
of lien must also be filed with the FAA in Oklahoma
City to obtain a validly perfected security interest in
the aircraft, enforceable not only against the owner
but also against third parties.92
Implementation of section 329.51 is not complicated, but the operationalization of that law has been the subject of considerable uncertainty for aviation practitioners, particularly regarding its crossreference to section 713.58.93 Did the Florida Legislature codify section 329.51 as a modification of the general law concerning liens
over personal property provided by section 713.58? If so, possession
is unnecessary to perfect a lien, and all that a lienor must do to perfect a lien is to record a verified lien notice as prescribed by the statute.94 Alternatively, insofar as section 329.51 refers to enforceability
and not perfection, the statute does not seem to create a lien right so
much as it provides the procedures for the enforcement of rights
arising from liens that already exist under section 713.58.95 Under
this view, resorting to section 329.51 is unnecessary unless and until
a repairman perfects under section 713.58 through possession.
In all, lining up sections 85.011, 713.58, and 329.51, Florida
Statutes, side-by-side has generated more questions than answers for
92

In re Tradewinds Airlines, Inc., 394 B.R. 614, 620 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2008).
See FLA. STAT. § 329.51 (2020).
94
See FLA. STAT. § 92.525 (2020) (verification of documents; perjury by
false written declaration, penalty).
95
Section 329.51 speaks in terms of enforceability only: “Any lien claimed
on an aircraft under [section] 329.41 or [section] 713.58 is enforceable when the
lienor records a verified notice . . . .” FLA. STAT. § 329.51 (2020) (emphasis
added). This language contrasts sharply with other Florida aviation laws that seem
to affirmatively create lien rights. FLA. STAT. § 329.40(1) (2020) (“The governing
body of a publicly owned and operated airport has a lien upon all aircraft landing
upon any airport owned and operated by it for all fees and charges for the use of
the facilities of such airport . . . .”) (emphasis added); FLA. STAT. § 329.41 (2020)
(“A person who has furnished fuel to an aircraft has a lien upon the aircraft for
any unpaid fuel charges . . . .”) (emphasis added)).
93
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aviation and commercial lawyers as to the relationship between possession and notice for purposes of perfecting a lien interest in aircraft under Florida law. Parts III.A.–C. below identify and evaluate
the seminal cases that tried to make sense of the possession-notice
conundrum under Florida’s lien law with respect to aircraft.
A.
In re Tradewinds Airlines, Inc.
One of the first cases to address the possession versus notice debate was a Chapter 11 proceeding captioned In re Tradewinds Airlines, Inc,96 decided by U.S. Bankruptcy Judge and former aviator
A. Jay Cristol.97 The case arose out of a dispute between a cargo
airline seeking reorganization and the maintenance company it hired
to conduct a ninety-six-month maintenance check on an A-300 airplane.98 The parties disagreed about whether maintenance was actually performed and whether any amount was owed; as part of the
dispute, the maintenance company refused to return the aircraft, asserting a statutory mechanic’s lien under section 713.58, Florida
Statutes.99 But the debtor-cargo airline moved to compel the turnover of the aircraft, arguing that the maintenance company failed to
perfect its lien under Florida law insofar as it had failed to timely
file its claim of lien prior to the bankruptcy petition date.100 Judge
Cristol agreed.101
According to the court, the maintenance company complied with
only one of the requirements of section 329.01, Florida Statutes.102
That is, it filed a verified notice of lien with the clerk of the circuit
court in the Florida county in which the aircraft received labor or
service, but it failed to record its lien with the FAA.103 Thus, while
the maintenance company recorded its lien in Florida before filing
96

In re Tradewinds Airlines, Inc., 394 B.R. at 615.
See Hon. A. Jay Cristol, UNIV. MIA. SCH. OF L., https://www.law.miami.edu/faculty/hon-jay-cristol (last visited May 15, 2021).
98
In re Tradewinds Airlines, Inc., 394 B.R. at 616–17.
99
Id. at 617.
100
Id.
101
Id. at 621.
102
See id.
103
Id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 329.01 (2020) (“No instrument which affects the
title to or interest in any civil aircraft of the United States . . . is valid in respect to
such aircraft . . . until such instrument is recorded in the office of the Federal Aviation Administrator of the United States.”).
97
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its bankruptcy petition, it had not filed its claim of lien with the FAA
until after the bankruptcy proceeding commenced.104 This proved
fatal, according to Judge Cristol, because the post-petition lien with
the FAA did not relate back to an earlier date pre-petition; consequently, the lien was avoidable by virtue of being unperfected.105
While the case did not address the concept of possession, In re
Tradewinds Airlines, Inc. detailed the relationship between state and
federal law respecting notice and recordation as it related to the issue
of perfection. It confirmed that failure to both file a notice of lien in
the proper state court and to record a notice of lien with the FAA
doomed the rights of repairmen relying on sections 713.58 and
329.51.
In reaching its conclusion, however, the court sowed doubt
about the importance of possession for lien perfection and enforcement purposes.106 Judge Cristol wrote: “Possession of an aircraft is
legally insufficient to perfect a mechanic’s lien against an aircraft
under Florida law.”107 This language in In re Tradewinds Airlines,
Inc. arguably seemed to give equal or greater weight to recordation
and notice than possession for perfection purposes. Moreover, this
lent support, at least theoretically, to the possibility that notice of a
lien under section 329.51, Florida Statutes (a statute specifically
dealing with aircraft liens), was more important—determinative, in
fact—of lien perfection than the state’s general mechanic’s lien established by section 713.58. This argument did not initially gain
traction, but it certainly clouded matters.
104

In re Tradewinds Airlines, Inc., 394 B.R. at 621.
Id.
106
See id. at 616–17, 621. The maintenance company had possession of the
aircraft as of the bankruptcy petition date and later relinquished possession only
because it was directed to do so—subject to certain enumerated conditions, including the preservation of whatever lien rights it had subject to further order of
the court determining whether its asserted liens were valid, and the extent and
priority of such liens. Id. at 616.
107
Id. at 621. The maintenance company relied on Carolina Aircraft Corp. v.
Commerce Trust Co., 289 So. 2d 37, 38 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974), which allowed
a possessory mechanic’s lien for repairs on an aircraft arising under section 713.58
to take priority over a properly filed chattel mortgage recorded with the FAA because a statutory lien against an aircraft could be perfected through possession.
Id. at 620. Nevertheless, Judge Cristol was “not persuaded by [Carolina’s] reasoning or holding, given that Carolina was decided before the Florida Legislature
enacted [section] 329.51 in 1984.” Id.
105
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B.
Commercial Jet, Inc. v. U.S. Bank, N.A.
Whereas In re Tradewinds Airlines, Inc. posited that some
mechanism other than possession could perfect an artisan’s lien, the
majority in Commercial Jet, Inc. emphatically rejected this idea.108
Specifically, at issue in Commercial Jet, Inc. was whether section
329.51 somehow modified section 713.58 by eliminating the requirement that an artisan must have possession of property over
which he asserts a lien.109 This issue arose when an aircraft maintenance and repair company sought to foreclose a mechanic’s lien for
more than $57,000 in connection with services it rendered on a Boeing 767.110 Critically—and, as it turned out, fatally—the maintenance company recorded a claim of lien for the unpaid balance
months after it relinquished possession of the aircraft and supposed
that notice of its lien under section 329.51 sufficed to achieve perfection of its interest in the aircraft.111 One year later, it sued to foreclose on the lien.112 On these facts, the aircraft owner argued that the
maintenance company “did not have possession of the aircraft when
it attempted to claim a possessory lien under section 713.58 [and
therefore could not] proceed in its attempt to foreclose on the purported lien.”113 The trial court agreed and granted summary judgment.114
The maintenance company appealed, but fared no better as the
Third District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s order on the
basis that section 329.51, Florida Statutes did “not create any new
lien rights” and was “manifestly a notice statute, as is apparent by
its title.”115 Furthermore, the state appellate court held that “section
108

See Com. Jet, Inc. v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 45 So. 3d 887, 888 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2010).
109
Id.
110
Id. at 887. The maintenance company sued only U.S. Bank to foreclose its
purported mechanic’s lien because the company that sought repairs, Silver Jet,
was in bankruptcy dissolution proceedings in England and had reverted the aircraft back to U.S. Bank. See Appellant, Commercial Jet, Inc.’s Reply Brief at 2,
Com. Jet, Inc., v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 76 So. 3d 913 (2011) (No. SC10-2438).
111
Com. Jet, Inc., 45 So. 3d at 887–88.
112
Answer Brief of Respondent U.S. Bank, N.A. at 2, Com. Jet, Inc., v. U.S.
Bank, N.A., 76 So. 3d 913 (2011) (No. SC10-2438).
113
Id. at 2–3 (emphasis added).
114
Com. Jet, Inc., 45 So. 3d at 888.
115
Id.
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329.51 has no application here because Commercial Jet never acquired a valid lien under sections 713.58 or 329.41.”116 Thus, in the
appellate court’s view, the maintenance company should have recorded its lien before it relinquished possession because recordation
otherwise was a futile exercise without possession.
Senior Judge Alan Schwartz dissented.117 He wrote that section
329.51 “clearly provides that a lien for repairs on an aircraft such as
the one in this case is perfected simply by recording a claim of lien
within ninety days of the services rendered.”118 Additionally, Judge
Schwartz repudiated the majority’s conclusion that section 329.51
“did not have the effect specifically provided by the legislature.”119
In this regard, Judge Schwartz characterized the majority’s opinion
as follows:
The majority holding . . . is in conflict with just
about every canon of legislative interpretation there
is, including: that statutory words must be accorded
their plain meaning; that every statute must be
deemed to have some meaning and accomplish
something (here, the court’s ruling renders the filing
of the lien of no effect whatever); that a statute dealing with a specific subject, such as aircraft, must be
deemed to control over a general one such as section
713.58, which applies to all personal property, and
no doubt other general rules which no one has
thought it necessary to devise—until now.120
116

Id.
Id. at 889 (Schwartz, J., dissenting).
118
Id. (emphasis added).
119
Id.
120
Id. The Supreme Court of Florida accepted jurisdiction to review the decision, but later discharged jurisdiction (as “improvidently granted”) and dismissed
the review proceeding. Com. Jet, Inc. v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 76 So. 3d 913, 913 (Fla.
2011) (mem.). In its jurisdictional brief, counsel for the lienor largely recycled the
points raised by the dissent while counsel for the aircraft owner explained that the
opinion neither conflicted with earlier appellate decisions nor involved facts substantially similar to those found in earlier decisions, and therefore, no basis for
invoking conflict jurisdiction existed. Appellant, Commercial Jet Inc.’s, Jurisdictional Brief at 4, Com. Jet, Inc. v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 76 So. 3d 913 (2011) (No.
117
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Curiously indeed, in reaching its conclusion, the Commercial
Jet, Inc. court relied on subsection (3) of section 713.58—and only
this statutory subpart of Florida’s general mechanic’s lien statute—
for the specific proposition that a repairman’s right to claim a mechanic’s lien over an aircraft is “extinguished when he relinquishes
possession of the property on which the lien is asserted.”121 Subsection (3) states:
In that the possessory right and lien of the person performing labor or services under this section is released, relinquished, and lost by the removal of such
property upon which a lien has accrued, it shall be
deemed prima facie evidence of intent to defraud if,
upon the removal of such property, the person removing such property utters, delivers, or gives any
check, draft, or written order for the payment of
money in payment of the indebtedness secured by the
lien and then stops payment on such check, draft, or
written order.122
Although this statutory subsection is focused on misconduct that
causes a lienor to involuntarily lose possession of the personal property over which a lien is asserted,123 the aircraft owner in Commercial Jet, Inc. argued that “[b]y the plain terms of subpart (3) [a mechanic’s lien] is ‘released’ and ‘relinquished’ and ‘lost’ upon ‘the
removal of such property.’”124
Thus, according to the aircraft owner, “[w]hen [the repairman in the case] released the aircraft, by the plain language of section 713.58(3), it ‘released’ and ‘relinquished’ and ‘lost’ its possessory lien. No lien, no resort to section 329.51.”125 The court’s
SC10-2438); Respondent’s Brief on Jurisdiction at 5–6, 8, Com. Jet, Inc. v. U.S.
Bank, N.A., 76 So. 3d 913 (2011) (No. SC10-2438).
121
See Com. Jet, Inc., 45 So. 3d at 888 (majority opinion).
122
FLA. STAT. § 713.58(3) (2020) (emphasis added).
123
See id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 713.58(4) (“Any person violating the provisions of this section shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction
shall be punished by fine of not more than $500 or imprisonment in the county
jail for not more than [three] months.”).
124
Answer Brief of Respondent U.S. Bank, N.A., supra note 112, at 10 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 713.58(3) (2009)).
125
Id. at 13 (emphasis added) (quoting FLA. STAT. § 713.58(3) (2009)).
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acceptance of this reading of the first clause of 713.58(3), as establishing—not just confirming—the possessory nature of mechanic’s
liens in Florida, is not altogether objectionable given the odd fact
that no other part of Florida statutory law directly or clearly says “no
possession, no lien.”
What drew an objection, however, was a construction of subpart
713.58(3) that somehow relegated section 329.51—and the filing of
a lien required under its terms—of no effect. The repairman in Commercial Jet, Inc., acknowledged subsection (3) and the strict dependence between perfection and possession to which it alluded.126 But,
the lienor also argued that the court was still compelled to read the
state’s general mechanic’s lien laws in conjunction with Florida’s
standalone law that specifically discussed aircraft liens.127 It argued,
“the courts have caught upon the provision in §713.58(3) . . . [and]
there is a line of cases providing that §713.58 . . . is a possessory
lien. However, had the legislature been satisfied with the courts’ interpretation . . . there would have been no new need to create
§329.51.”128
The Commercial Jet, Inc. court disagreed, however, drawing
from the fact that 713.58(3) “expressly provides that ‘the possessory
right and lien of the person performing labor or services under this
section is released, relinquished, and lost by the removal of such
property’” to conclude that “there is no question that the lien right
afforded by section 713.58 is possessory in nature and that a repairman’s right to claim a lien under section 713.58 is extinguished
when he relinquishes possession of the property on which the lien is
asserted.”129
The court was seemingly reassured of its conclusion by the curious cross-reference in section 329.51 to “[a]ny lien claimed on an
aircraft under . . . [section] 713.58.”130 The court thus characterized
the relationship between sections 713.58 and 329.51 in terms of timing: “Section 329.51 details how, once a fuel or service provider
126

See Appellant, Commercial Jet Inc.’s Initial Brief at 9, Com. Jet, Inc., v.
U.S. Bank, N.A., 76 So. 3d 913 (2011) (No. SC10-2438).
127
See id. at 8–9.
128
Id. at 9 (internal citations omitted).
129
Com. Jet, Inc. v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 45 So. 3d 887, 888 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2010) (quoting FLA. STAT. § 713.58(3) (2009)).
130
Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. § 329.51 (2009)).
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acquires a lien on an aircraft pursuant to section . . . 713.58, he may
perfect his lien and establish priority of enforcement as it relates to
third parties.”131 In doing so, the court did not bridge the concept
that Florida law required possession for general mechanic’s lien perfection purposes, on the one hand, with the state law’s separate statutory provision for the manner and method for the perfection of mechanic’s liens applicable to aircraft, on the other hand. Rather, the
court held up one statute, section 713.58, over another, section
329.51. And, in emphasizing the possessory nature of mechanic’s
liens (which no party disputed), minimizing section 329.51 to nothing more than a notice statute (a proposition based only on the word
“notice” in section 329.51’s title and about which judges on the
court and the parties disagreed), and conditioning the application of
section 329.51 on physical possession and perfection under section
713.58 (a requirement established nowhere explicitly in the text of
either statute), the court’s judgment raised more questions than it
answered.
What is more, the court’s minimal case law analysis belied its
certitude that “the statute expressly provides” that mechanic’s liens
on aircraft were categorically possessory in nature and that section
329.51 “does not create any new lien rights”132 and “is manifestly a
131

Id. (emphasis added).
Id. This conclusion apparently arose from argument that the then enacted
version of section 329.51 did not grant a lien right but merely set forth the procedure by which persons claiming liens may perfect claims of lien. See Answer Brief
of Respondent U.S. Bank, N.A., supra note 112, at 13. “By its plain language,”
the argument goes, “section 329.51 assumes a lien is in place.” Id. at 12.
Indeed, whereas section 329.51 provides that “[a]ny lien claimed on an aircraft under [section] 329.41 or [section] 713.58 is enforceable when the lienor
records a verified lien notice,” section 329.41 provides that “[a] person who has
furnished fuel to an aircraft has a lien upon the aircraft.” FLA. STAT. §§ 329.51,
329.41 (2020) (emphasis added). Relatedly, great variation exists among the various statutes that purport to create liens in Part II of Chapter 713 (“Liens, Generally”). Section 713.50, Florida Statutes, begins Part II by providing that
“[l]iens . . . shall exist in favor of the following persons,” followed by approximately twenty-five statutory provisions in Part II, of which fifteen simply discuss
liens “in favor of” particular kinds of artisans. FLA. STAT. §§ 713.56, 713.57,
713.58, 713.59, 713.60, 713.61, 713.62, 713.63, 713.64, 713.65, 713.655, 713.66,
713.67, 713.68, 713.70 (2020). Six more explicitly provide that “[a] lien . . . shall
exist” or use words of similar import. FLA. STAT. §§ 713.595, 713.77, 713.596,
132

1144

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75:1117

notice statute, as is apparent from its title.”133 In fact, the court provided only a string citation of four cases—all of which confirmed
what was already known and undisputed (e.g., that general mechanic’s liens are possessory in nature), and none of which analyzed
the material issue of whether Florida lawmakers intended to allow
lienors of aircraft an alternative mechanism for perfecting liens.134
Two of these decisions had nothing to do with airplanes, for example, and arose in factually inapposite circumstances. First, State
v. Miller involved the claim of an automobile repairman who was
arrested after failing to surrender possession of a car even after its
owner posted a bond in compliance with a state statute that required
repairmen to release the vehicle on the owner’s filing of a bond to
recover repair costs.135 The repairman in Miller challenged the statute as an unconstitutional deprivation of his property right without
due process of the law.136 The Supreme Court of Florida rejected
this claim, holding that the statute struck a “constitutional balance
between the interests of a person in the use and possession of his
property and the interests of a laborer in the existence of secure collateral commensurate with the value of his services.”137 While Miller aptly articulated the balance of interests that is always at issue in
the context of liens, it provided no clarity about how sections 713.58
and 329.51 worked together (or not).
Another case cited by the Commercial Jet, Inc. court—Archive
America, Inc. v. Variety Children’s Hospital138—likewise added no
insight about how to reconcile Florida’s notice and possession statutes for aircraft lien purposes. The Commercial Jet, Inc. court did
713.78, 713.785, 713.79 (2020). One states that “[t]he holder of a license . . . has
and may enforce . . . a lien.” FLA. STAT. § 713.665 (2020); see also FLA. STAT.
§ 713.691 (2020). One provides “held to have given . . . a statutory lien of prior
dignity to all other encumbrances.” FLA. STAT. § 713.71 (2020). Finally, one provides that “[a] person claiming a lien under [section] 713.58 for performing labor
or services on a motor vehicle may enforce such lien by sale.” FLA. STAT.
§ 713.585 (2020).
133
See Com. Jet, Inc., 45 So. 3d at 888.
134
See id.
135
State v. Miller, 373 So. 2d 677, 678 (Fla. 1979).
136
Id.
137
Id. at 681.
138
Archive Am., Inc. v. Variety Children’s Hosp., 873 So. 2d 359 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 2004).
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not suggest otherwise, citing the case only for the proposition that it
“referenc[ed] ‘a possessory lien established by section 713.58.’”139
That it did—in a context far removed from aviation. At issue in Archive America, Inc. was a dispute between a large warehouse that
stored literally millions of tons of patients’ medical records and a
hospital that sought to move the records to a competitor.140 A trial
court transferred the warehouseman’s lien to a bond even though
Florida law did not explicitly provide such a mechanism.141 Finding
that this was an appropriate exercise of the trial judge’s equitable
powers, the Archive America, Inc. court noted that the lienor’s reliance on Miller—and its discussion of section 713.58 as a possessory
lien—was misplaced.142 Again, other than, at best, establishing the
possessory nature of Florida’s general mechanic’s lien statute, Archive America, Inc. did not shed light on the applicability of section
329.51 nor demonstrate how or why section 329.51 was expressly
or indisputably inapplicable in light of section 713.58.
Third, the Commercial Jet, Inc. court cited Eastern Airlines Employees Federal Credit Union143 for the proposition that “a mechanic’s possessory lien against personal property (under a provision such as section 713.58, Florida Statutes) . . . continued as long
as [the lienor] continued in possession thereof.”144 While this language certainly confirmed how critical it was for artisans to maintain
possession under Florida law’s general mechanic’s lien, the case offered marginal value as to the issue of whether notice played an alternative role for lien perfection purposes with respect to aircraft as
the maintenance company in Commercial Jet, Inc. argued was explicit in section 329.51.
Finally, the Commercial Jet, Inc. court cited In re Tradewinds
Airlines, Inc., but not for its statement that “[p]ossession of an aircraft is legally insufficient to perfect a mechanic’s lien against an
139
See Com. Jet, Inc., 45 So. 3d at 888 (quoting Archive Am., Inc., 873 So. 2d
at 362).
140
Archive Am., Inc., 873 So. 2d at 360.
141
Id. at 361.
142
Id. at 362.
143
E. Airlines Emp. Fed. Credit Union v. Lauderdale Yacht Basin, Inc., 334
So. 2d 175 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
144
Com. Jet, Inc., 45 So. 3d at 888 (quoting E. Airlines Empls. Fed. Credit
Union, 334 So. 2d at 177).
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aircraft under Florida law.”145 Rather, the court cited In re
Tradewinds Airlines, Inc. for a parenthetical citation to a single sentence from a Massachusetts bankruptcy case: “Possession is the sine
qua non of [a section 713.58] lien.”146 Standing alone, this appeared
to support the Commercial Jet, Inc. court’s rationale and holding;
but it was not what the Massachusetts case, In re Garland,147 decided—nor did this statement influence Judge Cristol’s decision in
In re Tradewinds Airlines, Inc.
In re Garland involved the claim by a creditor to establish a mechanic’s lien on its debtor’s property under section 713.58.148 The
creditor had relinquished possession of the goods over which the
lien was asserted, but only because it was “induced to surrender possession by a fraudulent promise of payment” (by check) by the
debtor, “who knew it had no funds and was about to file a Chapter
11 bankruptcy proceeding.”149 Given this, the bankruptcy court permitted the creditor to proceed with a claim for an equitable lien because of the debtor’s fraudulent use of a check returned for insufficient funds.150 “Certainly in equity,” the court held, “the thief should
not be allowed to hide behind the victim’s resulting lack of possession.”151 Thus, in citing In re Garland for a rigid proposition—that
lien perfection is achieved only through physical possession—the
court oversimplified the case and its equitable dimension arising in
a factually inapposite context.

145

In re Tradewinds Airlines, Inc., 394 B.R. 614, 621 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2008).
Com. Jet, Inc., 45 So. 3d at 888 (citing In re Tradewinds Airlines, Inc., 395
B.R. at 622).
147
In re Garland Corp., 6 B.R. 452 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1980).
148
Id. at 453.
149
Id. The creditor sought two statutory liens for two different amounts due.
Id. Count I of its complaint concerned a debt of $81,932 and the remaining counts
centered on a debt of $112,437.82. Id. The court dismissed Count I because the
creditor had voluntarily relinquished possession of the goods at issue by stipulation and so could not satisfy the possessory requirement of the statutory lien allowed by section 713.58, Florida Statutes. See id. at 455. The second amount was
tainted by the debtor’s fraud, however, and thus eligible for the imposition of an
equitable lien in the court’s view. Id.
150
Id. at 455.
151
Id. at 456.
146

2021]

NOTICE: AIRCRAFT LIEN LAW IN FLORIDA

1147

In the final analysis, possession equals perfection was the legacy
of the decision in Commercial Jet, Inc.,152 but it did not solve the
possession versus notice problem as a practical matter. In fact, the
resolve of aircraft maintenance and repair providers to retain possession of an aircraft upon which a lien was asserted as long as possible—even wrongfully—intensified in the wake of Commercial
Jet, Inc., among other reasons, to avoid impairing their interests in
an inflexible “no possession, no lien” scheme.
C.
J.V. Air Maintenance, Inc. v. Westwind Leasing Corp.
Commercial Jet, Inc. presented turbulence in J.V. Air Maintenance, Inc. v. Westwind Leasing, Corp., in which an aircraft leasing
company refused to pay a repair bill it deemed “grossly exaggerated.”153 Consequently, the maintenance company sued to foreclose
on the mechanic’s lien it filed against the aircraft while in possession
of the aircraft.154 Additionally, the lienor retained possession of the
aircraft beyond the three-month period authorized by section 85.011,
Florida Statutes during which it served the aircraft’s owner with a
notice of non-judicial sale indicating its intent to sell the aircraft at
public auction during that period.155 The trial court cancelled the
proposed non-judicial sale and directed the return of the aircraft, and
the lienor appealed.156
In a unanimous decision, the Third District Court of Appeal recognized the repair company’s concern that the holding of Commercial Jet, Inc. “will cause the loss of its lien if the property is returned
152

See Global Xtreme, Inc. v. Advanced Aircraft Ctr., Inc., 122 So. 3d 487,
491 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013) (“Section 329.51 is a notice statute that applies to
liens claimed on an aircraft. Neither section 713.58 nor section 329.51 provides
for attorney’s fees.” (internal citations omitted) (citing Com. Jet, Inc. v. U.S.
Bank, N.A., 45 So. 3d 887 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010))); US Acquisition, LLC v.
Tabas, Freedman, Soloff, Miller & Brown, P.A., 87 So. 3d 1229, 1232–33 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (finding that a law firm’s charging lien for fees arising from
an aircraft replevin action was possessory in nature and unperfected because it
was not filed with the FAA); Signia Jets, L.L.C. v. N75GA, Ltd., No. CACE 14–
017628, 2017 WL 5201105 at *2, (Fla. Cir. Ct. Aug. 7, 2017) (finding no possession and therefore no encumbrance against the aircraft).
153
J.V. Air Maint., Inc. v. Westwind Leasing, Corp., 283 So. 3d 379, 379 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2019).
154
Id. at 379–80.
155
Id. at 380.
156
Id.
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under section 85.011,” but declined to read the case so broadly.157
Rather, the court contrasted the circumstances in Commercial Jet,
Inc., where the lienor voluntarily relinquished possession before
perfection, with the question before it: namely, whether a perfected
lien lapses when a lienor is required to return the property at the end
of the three months provided in section 85.011.158 The court noted
that “[t]he length of time the lien remains valid should not be confused with the length of time that a lienor has the right to possess the
property.”159
The court also minimized as “obiter dicta” the language in several other cases to the effect that a mechanic’s lien expires when
possession is lost.160 In doing so, the court claimed to have avoided
conflict with cases holding to the contrary, including long-standing
precedent expressly stating that a person asserting a mechanic’s lien
does not lose its lien when it is forced to surrender possession after
three months statutory period.161 And, although not crucial to its ruling, the court offered a somewhat linear and cohesive approach for
artisans to follow in pursuing a mechanic’s lien under Florida law
with respect to aircraft, stating:

157



Under the 2017 version of section 329.51 [and
Commercial Jet, Inc.], a lienor must have possession of the property at issue to perfect a lien.



One of the five statutory methods to enforce the
lien is to retain possession for three months.



If by purported payment, the owner induces the
lienor to surrender both possession and its lien,
but then cancels payment, those circumstances
are prima facie proof of fraudulent intent.

Id. at 381.
Id.
159
Id.
160
Id. at 382.
161
Id. at 381 (citing Ocala Foundry & Mach. Works v. Lester, 38 So. 51, 54
(Fla. 1905)).
158
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If the owner fails to seek return of the property at
the end of the three-month period, the lienor may
sell the property.



But if the owner demands possession at the end
of the three months, the lienor is forced to return
the property, although its lien continues. . . .



Moreover, additional remedies are provided to “a
person entitled to a lien under part II of chapter
713.” These include a lienor’s ability in certain
circumstances to attach the property in aid of
foreclosure. A lienor may do so if it “has reason
to believe, and does believe, that . . . the property
or part of it will be removed beyond the jurisdiction of the court,” subject to bonding and potential liability for a wrongful attachment.162
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This provided a prospectively useful checklist for practitioners and
courts to follow for aircraft mechanic’s liens, but it left open a number of issues. First, the court directly acknowledged that it did not
address “the rights of the lienor against third parties who may acquire an interest in the property without actual or constructive notice
of the lien [because] those issues . . . are not before us.”163 Second,
and perhaps most important, the J.V. Air Maintenance., Inc. decision
applied the 2017 version of 329.51, which the Florida Legislature
amended in 2019 to include the following sentence: “The lienor is
not required to possess the aircraft to perfect such a lien.”164
162

Id. at 382–83 (citations omitted).
Id. at 383.
164
Id. at 380 n.2 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 329.51 (2019)) (noting that newly
added statutory language did not impact its analysis). The Legislature also
amended section 329.41 (“Lien for fuel furnished to aircraft”), which now provides: “A person who has furnished fuel to an aircraft has a lien upon the aircraft
for any unpaid fuel charges, and possession of the aircraft is not required in order
to perfect such lien. The lien is enforceable in the same manner as provided in
[section] 329.51.” FLA. STAT. § 329.41 (2020) (emphasis added). The legislation
effecting these changes “does not affect the possessory nature of liens for labor or
services to other property claimed under [section 713.58] [for labor or services
performed on motor vehicles], or liens for landing claimed under [section 329.40].
163
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Having examined the body of Florida case law respecting mechanic’s liens over aircraft, this Article now focuses on the current
state of mechanic’s liens in Florida as applied to aircraft and orients
the laws of Florida with respect to similar laws across the United
States.
III.
DISCUSSION
The Florida Legislature’s amendment of section 329.51 in 2019
by and large brought to an end the challenge of divining whether,
when, if, and how Florida’s possessory mechanic’s lien statute under section 713.58 operates alongside the state’s aviation-specific
statutory framework that requires only notice for purposes of lien
perfection. Effective July 1, 2019,165 and prospective in its application,166 aviation law practitioners now have a clearer path toward
perfecting an aircraft lien. Stated otherwise, Judge Schwartz was
right; too bad for the maintenance company in Commercial Jet,
Inc.—it would have prevailed a decade ago under the same facts had
the current statutory scheme existed. That said, the fact that the outcome in Commercial Jet, Inc. could change so drastically on the
mere basis of a sentence eliminating possession as a condition of
perfection contextualizes the interpretative difficulties that section
329.51 has presented.
But a more useful question to evaluate than merely whether existing Florida law does or does not favor possession or notice for
lien perfection purposes as a matter of law (there is no question that
notice alone is now sufficient) is perhaps how to best balance the
rights of artisans and aircraft owners and users in a scheme that
makes allowances on both sides of the debate rather tilts the legal
landscape toward one side over another. In this context, this Part:
These liens remain possessory liens unless categorized otherwise in statute.” CIV.
JUST. COMM., FINAL BILL ANALYSIS, supra note 30, at 4.
165
CIV. JUST. COMM., FINAL BILL ANALYSIS, supra note 30, at 4.
166
E.g., Fla. Ins. Guar. Ass’n v. Devon Neighborhood Ass’n, 67 So. 3d 187,
195 (Fla. 2011) (“We again set forth the two-prong test for retroactivity: ‘First,
the Court must ascertain whether the Legislature intended for the statute to apply
retroactively. Second, if such an intent is clearly expressed, the Court must determine whether retroactive application would violate any constitutional principles.’” (internal citations omitted) (quoting Menendez v. Progressive Express Ins.,
35 So. 3d 873, 877 (Fla. 2010))).
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(1) situates Florida’s “new” aircraft mechanic’s lien statute within
the national landscape of aircraft liens; (2) evaluates the incentives
and disincentives that a notice-only lien scheme creates; and (3) argues in favor of an omnibus statute that both decouples Florida’s
stand-alone aviation statutory laws from the state’s general statutory
scheme for mechanic’s liens, and addresses comprehensively several core issues that arise again and again in aircraft mechanic’s lien
matters.
A.
Possession in Perspective
No court in Florida that has considered the subject of aircraft
mechanic’s liens under sections 329.51 and 713.58 has relied on the
lien laws of other states. This is curious given the lack of clear and
controlling precedent in the realm of aircraft lien law. What is more,
litigants have taken different and unexpectedly inflexible positions
about the appropriateness of looking to the lien laws of other jurisdictions as persuasive authority.
For example, in the course of opposing a restrictive, possessiononly reading of Florida law, the aircraft service facility in Commercial Jet, Inc. argued against consideration of the requirements of
other states with regard to perfection and enforcement of their mechanic’s liens: “What other states do is irrelevant when construing a
Florida statute.”167 Yet, in the same breath, it warned (incorrectly
and without data) that Florida would be unique among other states
and out-of-step when it comes to other states and aircraft services if
it declined to accept its “notice is sufficient” interpretation of section
329.51.168 Oppositely, the aircraft owner in Commercial Jet, Inc. argued that whether Florida law fell within or without national trends
was “easily verifiable” and that, in fact, other states required possession to perfect similar liens.169
In this context, the Appendix to this Article comprehensively
evaluates the mechanic’s lien laws of every state (including the
167

Appellant, Commercial Jet, Inc.’s Reply Brief, supra note 110, at 4 (“Policy considerations are properly argued to the legislative branch to seek to create a
new statute or modify an existing one. This Court is limited to enforcing the statutes a legislature has passed.”).
168
See id. at 4–6; Answer Brief of Respondent U.S. Bank, N.A., supra note
112, at 16.
169
Id. at 16.
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District of Columbia), including citation of the relevant laws, how
possession is perfected, and the operative statutory language. Doing
so yields a number of quantitative and qualitative insights from a
policy perspective, including that the lienor’s argument in Commercial Jet, Inc.—that only Florida law mattered—was against its own
interest given that the vast majority of jurisdictions (now including
Florida) do not condition perfection on possession.
To begin with, fewer than ten states expressly adapt or adhere to
the bright-line common law rule that perfection of a mechanic’s lien
is strictly dependent upon possession.170 Arguably, Florida is (or
was) among these states insofar as the first clause of section
713.58(3) articulates that a lien is “released, relinquished, or lost”
without possession.171 In any case, whereas the possessory nature of
Florida’s mechanic’s lien law has been a function of statutory interpretation, seven states (including the District of Columbia) are unambiguously explicit and express about the cruciality of possession
for perfection purposes. These states are: California (“every person
has a lien dependent upon possession”);172 the District of Columbia
(“if possession is parted with by his consent such lien shall
cease”);173 Iowa (“shall have a lien . . . while such property is lawfully in the person’s possession”);174 Montana (“[t]he lien is dependent on possession”);175 New Hampshire (“so long as the same shall
remain in his possession”);176 Pennsylvania (“is known as a ‘common law lien’ . . . while such property is in the hand of the said person”);177 and West Virginia (“while in possession thereof”).178 The
indispensability of possession in states like Colorado, Hawaii, and
Vermont are expressed otherwise, for example in court opinions.179

170

See infra Appendix.
FLA. STAT. § 713.58(3) (2020).
172
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1208.61 (Deering 2021).
173
D.C. CODE § 40-307.01 (2021).
174
IOWA CODE § 577.1 (2021).
175
MONT. CODE ANN. § 71-3-1201 (2019).
176
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 450:2 (2020).
177
6 PA. CONS. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 11 (West 2021).
178
W. VA. CODE § 38-11-3 (2020).
179
See, e.g., Wenz v. McBride, 36 P. 1105, 1106 (Colo. 1894) (“There must
be a possession of the thing; otherwise there cannot, without special agreement to
that effect, be any lien.”).
171
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Three other states—Delaware, New York and North Carolina—
do not necessarily require possession for perfection, but the consequences of relinquishing possession are unforgiving if not followedup by some other action. For example, in North Carolina, a lien survives “even if the possession of the aircraft is surrendered by the
lienor,” provided that the lienor files a notice of lien with the appropriate court clerk within 120 days after voluntarily surrendering possession of the aircraft.180 Comparatively, New York law provides
that “if the lienor, subsequent to thirty days from the accrual of such
lien, allows the . . . aircraft out of his actual possession the lien provided for in this section shall thereupon become void as against all
security interests, whether or not perfected.”181 Likewise, Delaware
requires a lienholder, “within 10 days from the time of the loss of
possession” to “file[] an application for the issuance of an authorization to conduct a lien sale or file[] a counterclaim for the sale of
the encumbered property pursuant to this chapter in a replevin action.”182
Relatedly, three states (Alaska, Connecticut, and Wyoming) require an artisan to file a lien statement before relinquishing possession—akin to the reading of section 329.51 recognized in Commercial Jet, Inc.183 Six other states are less rigid in that they require artisans to file or record a claim of lien but allow them to do so if and
after they relinquish possession. This is the case in Arizona,184 Arkansas,185 Georgia,186 Kansas,187 Kentucky,188 and Missouri.189
Whether to include these nine states under the heading of “no possession, no lien”—along with states that do not require possession
for perfection, but which void a lien once possession is relinquished
(e.g., Delaware, New York, and North Carolina)—is more art than

180

N.C. GEN. STAT. § 44A-55 to -60 (2020).
N.Y. LIEN LAW § 184 (McKinney 2021).
182
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, §§ 3901–3902 (2020).
183
See ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 34.35.185 (West 2020); CONN. GEN. STAT.
§ 49-92g (2019); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 29-7-102 (West 2020).
184
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-1022 (2021).
185
ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-45-206 (2020).
186
GA. CODE ANN. § 44-14-363 (2020).
187
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-3122 (2020).
188
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 376.270 (LexisNexis 2020).
189
MO. REV. STAT. § 430.020 (2020).
181
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science. For that matter, three states (Alabama,190 Idaho,191 and Oregon192) ostensibly recognize both possessory and non-possessory
mechanic’s liens.
Suffice it to say that tabulating the number of “no possession, no
lien” states lacks total precision, but one trend is clear: maintaining
possession for as long as legally possible is a wise if not imperative
strategy in nineteen states (including the District of Columbia),
which as a unit constitute a minority position. The vast majority of
states, on the other hand, require only the recordation or filing of a
claim to perfect a lien. To be clear, each of these “notice-only” states
allows lienholders to retain possession (often until the debt is fully
paid), but seem indifferent to whether a lienor voluntarily loses or
relinquishes possession.193 For that matter, “notice-only” jurisdictions seem not to care if the lienor ever had and then lost possession
for perfection purposes. Pursuant to the recent amendment to section
329.51, Florida now falls within this “notice-only” rubric where a
lienor has the option of maintaining possession for up to ninety days
and the obligation to file a notice in order to perfect a lien.194 Florida
joins twenty-five other states in so providing.
Altogether, possession is an explicit feature (but not a requirement) of nearly every general mechanic’s lien and specific aircraft
lien law in the country.195 As mentioned, some state laws, like those
of California, strictly mandate possession to perfect a lien.196 The
only imperative for perfection in other states, however, is the filing
of claim of lien without which no lien exists (e.g., Massachusetts
(“Unless the person entitled to such lien shall file such statement
190

ALA. CODE § 35-11-110 (2021); see also Peavy’s Serv. Ctr., Inc. v. Assocs.
Fin. Servs. Co., 335 So. 2d 169, 170–71 (Ala. Civ. App. 1976) (“Alabama is one
of the states which provides two mechanic’s liens . . . . [T]he statutory mechanic’s
lien . . . merely supplements, not supplants, the common law mechanic’s lien. The
common law lien is a possessory lien and is lost by release of the property. The
statutory lien is not dependent upon maintaining possession, but may be perfected
after release of the property.” (internal citations omitted)).
191
IDAHO CODE § 45-1101 (2020).
192
OR. REV. STAT. § 87.152 (2020) (possessory); id. § 87.216 (non-possessory).
193
See infra Appendix.
194
FLA. STAT. § 329.51 (2020).
195
See infra Appendix.
196
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1208.61 (Deering 2021).
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within the time aforesaid, he shall be deemed to have waive his
rights thereto . . . .”)197 and South Carolina (“[Aircraft liens] shall be
dissolved unless the person claiming it shall file . . . .”)198). Between
these two poles—perfection strictly dependent upon possession and
perfection by notice or filing only—are a number of alternative approaches, summarized as follows:

197
198



No Possession. No Lien. Nine states, plus the District of
Columbia, provide that perfection is strictly dependent
upon possession and they all do so explicitly: California,
Colorado, District of Columbia, Hawaii, Iowa, Montana,
New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, Vermont, and West Virginia. Section 713.58(3) does this in Florida, too.



Filing While in Possession: Three states (Alaska, Connecticut, and Wyoming) require that lienholders file a
lien statement with the relevant authorities before relinquishing possession. This was Florida’s approach according to the Commercial Jet, Inc. court.



Filing After Relinquishing Possession. Six states mandate that lienors record and file a claim of lien within a
set number of days (x) after relinquishing possession,
with one month being the least amount of time and six
months being the most: Arizona (30), Arkansas (120),
Georgia (90), Kansas (90), Kentucky (180), and Missouri (180). Delaware, New York, and North Carolina do
not explicitly condition perfection on possession, but
they provide that a mechanic’s lien will be void if possession is relinquished (thirty days in the case of New
York and 120 days in the case of North Carolina). Delaware law, meanwhile, states that a lien will continue in
full force and effect “provided that within 10 days from
the time of the loss of possession the lienholder . . . files
an application for the issuance of an authorization to conduct a lien sale or files a counterclaim for the sale of the

MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 255, §31E (2019).
S.C. CODE ANN. § 29-15-100 (2020).
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encumbered property . . . in a replevin action.” This approach was rejected in Commercial Jet, Inc.


Notice (or Filing) Only. Twenty-six states allow lienors
to retain possession (albeit for a limited amount of time,
usually 60, 90, 120, or 180 days), but condition perfection on the filing or recording of a claim of lien only:
Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin. One state, Nebraska, provides that liens are perfected as provided in Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code.



Possession and/or Non-possession. Three states provide
both a possessory and non-possessory lien. Alabama, for
example, recognizes both a common law lien dependent
upon possession and a statutory lien that may be perfected after release of the property. Idaho and Oregon,
meanwhile, recognize two types of statutory mechanics’
liens—one requiring possession and the other not.199

By amending section 329.51 to explicitly and unambiguously
disconnect the concepts of possession and perfection for purposes
of a mechanic’s lien applicable to aircraft, Florida has joined the
majority of jurisdictions where “[p]ossession of an aircraft,” in the
language of In re Tradewinds Airlines, Inc., “is legally insufficient
to perfect a mechanic’s lien against an aircraft under Florida law.”200
Therefore, notice alone suffices, but should it? And, as a normative matter, should the Legislature have abrogated the common law
and changed Florida’s aircraft lien laws to such a degree? The following sections evaluate these questions.

199

See infra Appendix; Com. Jet, Inc. v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 45 So. 3d 887, 888
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
200
In re Tradewinds Airlines, Inc., 394 B.R., 614, 621 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2008).
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B.
No Possession, No Incentive?
The Florida Legislature amended section 329.51 to “make it easier for a lienor to recover money owed to him without keeping a
commercial aircraft out of service and potentially disrupting commercial air travel.”201 The statutory amendment also was designed
to “allow the owner or operator of an aircraft on which a lien is
claimed to keep using the aircraft while he works to satisfy the
lien.”202 To be sure, these are laudable policy goals, but they leave
unresolved a number of normative and practical questions, including
whether the new statutory regime, by removing the leverage gained
through a possessory lien, will disincentivize payment up front or
promote surprise clouds on airplane title, as the aircraft owner in
Commercial Jet, Inc. forecast.203
Indeed, several factors mitigate in favor of a “no possession, no
lien” regime and against a notice-only rule, as argued by the aircraft
owner in Commercial Jet, Inc. First, the history of section 329.51
lends credence to the argument that, apparently until now, the Legislature did not intend to displace a possession-based scheme for
possession:
Here is the actual history. Before the enactment in
1983 of section 329.51, the Florida Statutes did not
set forth any procedures by which one could record a
mechanic’s lien on an aircraft in Florida. The Federal
Aviation Act, however, required the FAA to look to
state law in determining the validity of claims of lien
on aircraft that were recorded with the FAA. Because
Florida did not have an aircraft lien recording statute,
the FAA determined that it could no longer record
claims of lien for labor, services, or material furnished to aircraft in Florida. As a result, the Florida
legislature enacted section 329.51 to correct that situation by providing specific requirements for recording aircraft liens. The Legislature was not creating
201

CIV. JUST. COMM., FINAL BILL ANALYSIS, supra note 30, at 4. The reason
that only “commercial aircraft” and not general aviation aircraft are mentioned as
part of the analysis is unstated. See id.
202
Id.
203
See Answer Brief of Respondent U.S. Bank, N.A., supra note 112, at 17.
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any new lien rights. It was simply aligning Florida
law so that existing rights under Florida law—such
as possessory liens under section 713.58—could be
recorded and recognized by the FAA.204
This historical account went uncontested in Commercial Jet, Inc.,205
a concession that no doubt strengthened the aircraft owner’s argument:
Filing a piece of paper in Miami-Dade County recording a purported lien does not get it back. And
that is how it should be. Possessory liens require possession, and the leverage of possession resolves disputes over payment. Commercial Jet would have this
Court create a new category of non-possessory “possessory liens” and permit clouds on title up to 90 days
after services are provided. Nothing in the text or history of the statute supports that interpretation, and
there is no reasonable policy justification in favor of
it. [Such a] proposition will not help resolve disputes;
it will instead create headaches for purchasers downstream. [An artisan] absolutely has rights against [its
debtor]. But it has no right to spring a lien on the aircraft’s owner merely by attempting to record a lien
for [the debtor’s] unpaid bills. . . .206
....
Allowing service providers to wait [ninety] days and
then seek liens on aircraft that are routinely bought
and sold and moved on and off leases is a recipe for
clouded title and aggrieved bona fide purchasers.
This case is a good illustration. Silver Jet may know
full well that it has not paid its bill, but there was no
way—and, quite frankly, recording in Miami-Dade
County does not assist much—for the owner of the
aircraft to know that title has been clouded. If the
204
205
206

Id. at 14–15 (internal citations omitted).
See Appellant, Commercial Jet, Inc.’s Reply Brief, supra note 110, at 4.
Answer Brief of Respondent U.S. Bank, N.A., supra note 112, at 1–2.
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aircraft is then moved to a new owner, the new owner
likewise has no warning. Indeed, given the [ninety]day window that Commercial Jet thinks ought to apply, a sale could occur and then months after the
transaction a lien could appear on the recently purchased aircraft.207
Alternatively, as asserted by the lienor in Commercial Jet, Inc.,
the common law paradigm of possession-for-perfection may just not
work well for airplanes given that aircraft labor, service, and material providers oftentimes do not and cannot exercise possession over
personal property in ways that other artisans might as to other kinds
of assets:
Unlike [section] 713.58, which grants a general lien
right against miscellaneous personal property, [section 329.51] is specific to aircraft. Chapter 329 [] addresses the very different nature of aircraft as opposed to other personal property. First, unlike other
personal property, when aircraft require repair, they
often cannot be flown or towed down the street to a
repair facility. Repairs occur wherever the aircraft
may be located . . . . [Section 329.51] applies equally
to large aircraft maintenance performed at a maintenance facility as well as to smaller entities, often consisting of only licensed mechanics who perform
maintenance and repairs on aircraft wherever the aircraft may be located, such as the owner’s private
hangar or on the airport tarmac where the aircraft is
normally parked. In the latter case, those mechanics
are no more in possession of the aircraft than a
roofer is in possession of the house whose roof he has
repaired. [Section 329.51] applies in all of these situations.208
207

Id. at 8–9.
Appellant, Commercial Jet Inc.’s Initial Brief, supra note 126, at 8–9 (emphasis added). Aspects of the maintenance company’s argument invoked notes of
maritime law:
208
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Framed in this way, section 713.58 and its possessory requirement seem out of place as applied to airplanes, as does the concept
that the recording imperative in section 329.51 is somehow an exercise with no real benefit to lienors:
A careful review of [Chapter 329] discloses the difference in the legislature’s treatment of the various
lien rights. [Section 329.40], providing for a lien in
favor of a government owned airport provides for a
When Silver Jet hired Commercial Jet to perform maintenance
and improvements upon the aircraft owned by U.S. Bank, Commercial Jet improved the aircraft via its labor and materials and
thereby increased the value of U.S. Bank’s aircraft. The aircraft
was redelivered to Silver Jet by Commercial Jet on April 20,
2008 and then shortly thereafter U.S. Bank cancelled the lease
with Silver Jet and retook possession of its aircraft, an aircraft
worth more than it would have been but for Commercial Jet’s
work and services. That made the aircraft more valuable and
should have assisted U.S. Bank in leasing or selling the aircraft
thereafter. Therefore, it is clear that U.S. Bank was benefited
as a result of the labors, services and materials rendered by
Commercial Jet to the aircraft. It is this benefit to the owner of
a chattel that gives rise to artisan liens. Simply put, U.S. Bank
was benefited by the work performed by Commercial Jet and it
is both fair and reasonable that U.S. Bank should pay for same.
This is the result required by [section 329.51].
Appellant, Commercial Jet, Inc.’s Reply Brief, supra note 110, at 2–3 (emphasis
added). The maintenance company went on to say that
This Court must keep in mind that this statute applies not only
to large maintenance facilities such as Commercial Jet, but also
to aircraft mechanics throughout the state who go to an aircraft
owner or operator’s hangar or aircraft parking space and perform services on the aircraft at such locations. Those persons
are never in possession of the aircraft. [Section 329.51] nonetheless provides them a remedy to ensure that they are paid for
the value of their labor and the increased value in the aircraft,
the benefits of which flow to the aircraft owner. If U.S. Bank
wishes to argue fairness, nothing can be more fair than to allow
persons and entities who perform services on these highly mobile assets which may or may not ever be in the possession of
the mechanic to have a remedy to ensure that the mechanic is
paid for the materials and services provided which ultimately
benefits no one other than the owner of the aircraft.
Id. at 5–6 (emphasis added); see also supra Part I.
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possessory enforcement. However, [section 329.41]
simply provides a lien right for persons providing
fuel to aircraft upon recording a claim of lien per
[section 329.51] [which] then provides that persons
claiming liens under [section 329.41] and persons
claiming lien against an aircraft pursuant to [section
713.58] shall have an enforceable lien if they record
a Claim of Lien within [ninety] days. The legislature
clearly intended that [section 329.51] provided lien
rights without retention of possession. Had the legislature intended to create a simple recording statute it
would have said that persons claiming a lien under
[section 329.41] or [section 713.58] must record a
Claim of Lien within [ninety] days after the provision
of the services. But the legislature went much farther
than that. The legislature stated that persons claiming
liens under those two sections have enforceable liens
if a verified lien notice is filed with the Clerk of
Court within [ninety] days. Any other interpretation
would render this language a nullity and in violation
of the tenets of statutory construction.209
What is more:
If the legislature wanted liens under [section 713.58]
to exist and be enforced solely by possession, it could
have omitted the reference to [section 713.58] here
and left the current body of law interpreting that statute as it is. In the alternative, the legislature could
have reinforced the existing possessory enforcement
procedure by stating that liens under [section 713.58]
should be enforced as provided for enforcement of
warehouse liens, as it mentioned only two sections
previously.
Finally, the last sentence of [section 329.51] states
that the section does not affect the lienor’s obligation
to record the lien under [section 329.01]. It is clear
209
See Appellant, Commercial Jet Inc.’s Initial Brief, supra note 126, at 17–
18 (internal citations omitted).
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from this last sentence that the legislature did not intend for [section 329.51] to be a mere recording statute. The recording statute is contained in [section
329.01] clearly describes what is required to have an
enforceable lien for either fuel furnished to an aircraft under [section 329.41] or for materials and labor provided under [section 713.58].
. . . [T]he legislature obviously recognized the expediency with which commercial aircraft must be returned to revenue generating service. This intent is
supported by the different treatment the legislature
gave to those who provide fuel and services to aircraft. Large commercial aircraft generate huge
amounts of revenue while in service. This revenue
stream cannot be delayed while waiting to pay the
fuel bill or waiting to find out the cost of the last minute service or overhaul of a critical component of
the aircraft. Following the express language of [section 329.51] allows these suppliers (fuel or maintenance) to safely and immediately release the aircraft
to revenue service without concern their lien rights
will be lost.210
In the final analysis, advocates and opponents of the “no possession, no lien” and “notice-only” camps both raised compelling
points, invoking the phrase “half a dozen of one, six of the other.”
Neither position is obviously superior. Moreover, though both claim
to be informed by the “plain meaning” of the statutes in question,211
neither challenges the main objective of Florida lien law—to move
parties toward resolution of their dispute. In this vein, the law of
contract and further statutory revision may offer a more productive
path forward than requiring courts to choose between one position
or the other as a reaction to confusingly crafted laws.

210
211

at 1.

Id. at 13–14 (internal citations omitted).
See id. at 5; Answer Brief of Respondent U.S. Bank, N.A., supra note 112,
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C.
A Better Approach
Florida’s “new” aviation lien laws effectively put the possession
versus notice problem to rest relative to the issue of perfection, but
they also unintentionally generate a number of important questions.
First, the law’s impact on the rights of lienors against third parties
who may acquire an interest in the property without actual or constructive notice of the lien is unclear.212 Also ambiguous is the role
(if any) and scope of possession in a notice-only scheme. Finally,
the need for a comprehensive and streamlined statutory regime for
aircraft mechanic’s liens remains. This Part addresses these issues
by highlighting the importance of contract law in the context of disputes arising from aircraft maintenance and repair services and then
recommending a legislative (and potentially judicial) fix.
As an initial matter, Florida’s aviation mechanic’s lien statutes
are silent as to the issue of privity. The Commercial Jet, Inc. litigation demonstrated as much. That is, who the maintenance company
sued was a contentious point that was briefed213 (though unmentioned in the published decision). Specifically, the lienor there sued
the owner (U.S. Bank) of the aircraft on which it did work instead
of the entity that hired it to perform maintenance and repair services,
namely U.S. Bank’s lessee (Silver Jet).214 The lienor apparently did
so because Silver Jet was engaged in bankruptcy dissolution proceedings in England, and U.S. Bank had retaken possession of its
leased aircraft.215 U.S. Bank argued that it was not aware of the repairs made on the aircraft or of Silver Jet’s default and that the lienor
had failed to give it notice before filing its claim.216 It also noted that
in jurisdictions like Texas, owner-consent is required to have a valid
mechanic’s lien on an aircraft.217 In this context, for the bank, in its
role as aircraft lessor, holding an aircraft owner responsible for work
it did not commission or know about represented an

212

See J.V. Air Maint., Inc. v. Westwind Leasing, Corp., 283 So. 3d 379, 383
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2019).
213
See Answer Brief of Respondent U.S. Bank, N.A., supra note 112, at 3.
214
Id. at 5.
215
Appellant, Commercial Jet Inc.’s Initial Brief, supra note 126, at 2.
216
See Answer Brief of Respondent U.S. Bank, N.A., supra note 112, at 5.
217
Id. at 16 (citing Astraea Aviation Servs., Inc. v. Nations Air Inc., 172 F.3d
390, 393–95 (5th Cir. 1999)).
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implausible reading of the applicable statutes [that]
achieves no useful public policy. The far better norm
is that a possessory lien requires possession, which is
supported by both the plain language of section
713.58 and existing precedent. Commercial Jet
should have held the aircraft and insisted upon payment or required a deposit that could have been forfeited. Imposing lax rules on seeking liens against
aircraft owners is not a reasonable solution. It is unfair to parties who had nothing to do with the nonpayment for services, and it does not foster efficient
dispute resolution. There is no reason to bend the
rules of possessory liens in Florida from what appears on the face of section 713.58 and what cases
have recognized for decades: no possession, no possessory lien.218
What this argument brought into focus was the uncertainty created by Florida’s aviation mechanic’s lien and how helpful it would
be to have, as other states do, a statute identifying the parties falling
within its ambit. It also highlighted an underappreciated mechanism
that MROs and their clients can and should deploy to avoid protracted litigation that turns on statutory construction: contracts.
In fact, the best strategy for a person who has furnished labor,
services, fuel, or materials for an aircraft to collect a debt owed to it
may well be to avoid Florida’s lien statutes altogether. It is true that,
under the amended version of section 329.51, debtors may be less
incentivized to pay up front, or even pursuant to a written agreement,
because they might expect return of their property as a matter of law.
By committing their relationship to a written contract, however, artisans and their clients will be spared the task of navigating through
a maze of imperfectly worded laws, and they will have the power to
proactively secure both payment and possession on terms acceptable
to each.
In Commercial Jet, Inc., for example, the maintenance company
and its client, Silver Jet, had an agreement in place that expressly

218

Id. at 17 (emphasis added).
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limited the lien that the artisan could seek to a mechanic’s lien requiring possession.219 It provided that the maintenance company
shall not suffer or permit any lien or encumbrance to
be created or exist against the Aircraft by reason of
the Services performed hereunder, other than [its]
mechanics lien, if any, and [the maintenance company] agrees to immediately release the Aircraft to
Customer upon completion of the Services and payment of all charges in accordance with this Agreement.220
The agreement thus expressly recognized Commercial Jet’s right to
hold the aircraft under a mechanic’s lien, insist on full payment, and
sue for breach of contract.221 As such, U.S. Bank argued that:
Aircraft service providers like Commercial Jet do not
require any special lien rights. They already have the
same contractual rights that any other service provider has. As other courts have recognized, the most
efficient way to ensure payment is for the service
provider to demand payment before release of the
aircraft. In the alternative, deposits can be sought and
then forfeited if payment is not made.222
“Hold the aircraft. Demand payment. If Commercial Jet had done
that, as its own services agreement set forth, there would have been
no dispute here,”223 U.S. Bank asserted.
Invariably, parties will fail to enter into an agreement and assert
control over their future dealings and avert legal controversies, or
they will draft ineffective agreements, or they will fail to act upon
their agreement as apparently was the case in Commercial Jet, Inc.
In those cases, Florida’s statutory law will remain the default, much
the same way the state’s intestacy scheme is triggered in the absence

219
220
221
222
223

See id. at 4.
Id.
Id. at 8.
Id.
Id. at 7.
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of a decedent’s will or testamentary trust. As it stands, however, the
law in Florida with respect to aircraft liens is still indefinite.
The 2019 amendments certainly clarify a key issue—namely,
that possession is unnecessary for perfection. Yet, that may not necessarily discourage lienors from asserting a possessory interest and,
in fact, possession may continue to be of significant strategic importance for a lienor. So, even if notice is now the mechanism for
achieving perfection of a mechanic’s lien in Florida, section 329.51
appears to have retained its possessory nature by virtue of its reference to section 713.58, putting Florida in the company of Alabama,
Idaho, and Oregon—states that appear to have both possessory and
non-possessory mechanic’s liens.224 If this is not the case, then reference to section 713.58 in section 329.51 does not make sense and
should be deleted.
In any case, even if the amendments to Chapter 329 are interpreted as unambiguously recognizing notice over possession for
purposes of perfection, enforcement-related questions remain. For
example, given the new statutory language that “possession of the
aircraft is not required in order to perfect such lien,”225 do aviation
mechanic’s liens still fall within Part II of Chapter 713, which applies to possessory liens? If not, then application of Chapter 85, governing enforcement of statutory liens “provided for by . . . part II of
Chapter 713”226 to aviation mechanic’s liens no longer matters, and
it would seem the three-month limitation on a lienor’s possessory
right under section 85.011227 no longer applies to aircraft. If all this
is correct, lienors could conceivably assert a possessory interest on
an aircraft indefinitely and potentially at little cost other than perhaps a replevin action. After all, possession may not be required for
perfection, but it certainly could be effective in creating enormous
leverage in favor of a lienor. This would bring Florida law closer to
the common law rule allowing a lienor (who has otherwise perfected
his lien via notice under section 329.51) to retain possession of an
aircraft for as long as a debt remained outstanding.228 Finally, does
the updated language in section 329.51 eviscerate the coherent plan
224
225
226
227
228

See supra notes 190–92.
FLA. STAT. § 329.41 (2020).
FLA. STAT. § 85.011 (2020).
FLA. STAT. § 85.011(1) (2020).
See supra Part III.A.
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envisioned in J.V. Air Maintenance, Inc., which was predicated on
the 2017 version of the statute?229
What all of these questions recommend is that the Legislature
further and substantially revamp Florida law, once and for all, to
achieve a cohesive standalone statutory regime for aircraft liens that
is independent of Chapter 713. To do so, a comprehensive view of
mechanic’s liens around the nation is helpful. The Appendix to this
Article provides such a wide-ranging study and reveals that certain
core issues arise again and again in the context of aircraft liens. Florida lawmakers would do well to borrow aspects of these laws to
fashion its own statutory regime consistent with its policy goals of
balancing the objectives of securing payment for artisans without
exacting an unnecessarily heavy toll on aircraft owners and operators.
Certain trends are discernable from a review of the aviation mechanic’s lien laws of every state. For instance, seven issues seem to
be core to the subject matter of mechanic’s liens around the nation:
(1) how to perfect the lien (possession and/or notice and/or filing);
(2) how to perfect the lien if possession is lost, either voluntarily or
by fraud; (3) lien duration; (4) bonding;230 (5) attorneys’ fees; (6)
foreclosure or sale of aircraft; and (7) priority.231
This Article recommends creation of an omnibus mechanic’s
lien law in Florida that addresses each of these matters. Doing so
will ease the burden on practitioners and courts who must (still)
wade through numerous statutory provisions that lack an over-arching coherence. Florida’s aviation mechanic’s liens could be
amended further, as follows:

229
230
231



The Legislature should blend sections 329.41 and 329.51
to avoid duplication, as both cover the issue of liens for
fuel furnished to aircraft. In this regard, the reference to
section 329.41 in section 329.51 should be deleted.



Reference in section 329.51 to section 713.58 should be
deleted. If possession is no longer a predicate of perfection, as section 329.51 now explicitly says, the reference

See supra Part II.
See ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-45-205 (2020); FLA. STAT. § 713.76 (2020).
See infra Appendix.
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to Florida’s possessory general mechanic’s lien law no
longer makes sense and may simply promote further confusion. Indeed, if the law allows the lienor to secure his
interest simply by recording his claim of lien, fairness
requires that he also relinquish possession.

232



Section 329.51 should incorporate the language of section 713.58(3) or otherwise expressly criminalize conduct that improperly induces a lienholder to relinquish
possession.



Section 329.51 nowhere references Chapter 85, which
relates to enforcement of statutory liens. It should do so.
Better yet, section 329.51 should explicitly detail the enforcement mechanisms for aircraft mechanic’s liens,
borrowing language from sections 85.011 to 85.051 as
appropriate.



The Legislature should specify whether the lien has an
expiration date. Relatedly, to the extent section 85.011
no longer applies to section 329.51, lawmakers should
specify the length of time a lienor can maintain possession. Wyoming law, for example, provides that the right
of possession terminates six months after the date upon
which the charges become due and payable unless the
claimant commences proceedings to foreclose the
lien.232



An attorneys’ fee provision should be added in favor of
the prevailing party, or perhaps even to the extent allowed in Indiana whereby the plaintiff may “recover

See WYO. STAT. ANN. § 29-7-102 (West 2020); see also 770 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. §§ 45/1, 45/2 (LexisNexis 2020) (stating that any person firm, or corporation who has a lien under the statute has a lien “for a period of one year from
and after the completion of such expenditure . . . notwithstanding the fact that the
possession of such chattel has been surrendered to the owner, or lawful possessor
thereof.”).
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reasonable attorneys’ fees” in a suit in which the plaintiff
“recovers judgment in any sum.”233
By adding some or all of these (and other) features, the Legislature
can establish reasonable tradeoffs that properly acknowledge the
practical and legal vulnerabilities of artisans who improve personal
property, while incentivizing debtors to resolve their debts quickly.
Additionally, a number of other laws contain provisions that
Florida lawmakers might find useful. The Aeronautics Code of the
State of Michigan is a useful template, for example. Not only does
Michigan’s aeronautics code include most of the core components
identified above, but it also does so in one place.234 It makes clear
statements like “the common law garage keeper’s lien as to an aircraft is abolished.”235 Texas law similarly communicates clear
standards that allow courts and litigants to focus on the merits of a
lien rather than procedural aspects of the lien. That is, Texas law
provides that an artisan is entitled to the amount due under a contract, or where no amount is specific, the reasonable and usual compensation for such work.236 Texas law also requires that a lienholder
who retains possession of an aircraft must notify the owner.237 Modeling the form and substance of these laws would be a breath of fresh
air compared to Florida’s current scheme that wanders across multiple statutes often without citation or reference points.
Finally, lawmakers should also consider fortifying the equitable
powers of courts with respect to aircraft liens. Ideally, the legacy of
the now-overturned Commercial Jet, Inc. is that nobody will claim
that lien laws are plain to apply or that application of Florida’s mechanic’s lien laws are rigid. To the extent parties have a written contract that indicates an intention to charge a particular property with
a debt or obligation, courts should strive to serve the equities of particular situations or cases. To be sure, parties should be spending
their time resolving the substantive merits of their dispute, and
courts are generally inherently well equipped to eliminate or punish

233
234
235
236
237

IND. CODE § 32-33-10-9 (2020) (emphasis added).
See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 259.205–.205b (West 2020).
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 259.205a(3) (West 2020).
TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 70.301 (West 2019).
TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 70.304 (West 2019).
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plaintiffs who would wrongfully assert liens and debtors who game
statutory ambiguities to avoid legitimate obligations.
CONCLUSION
In the final analysis, the Florida Legislature’s amendments to
sections 329.41 and 329.51, clarifying that possession is no longer a
precondition to perfection of an aviation mechanic’s lien, resolves
decades of confusion for Florida aviation and commercial lawyers.
But, reduced to its essence, the legislative changes reflect that lawmakers have merely swapped out a possession-for-perfection
scheme for a notice-is-all-that-is-required-for-perfection regime.
Apparently the lienor’s bar had the better lobbyists this time around.
But is that how a lasting and principled body of law should be developed?
This Article has argued that it is not. Both artisans and the owners and operators of the aircraft to which they provide labor, services, fuel, and materials have compelling reasons for preferring one
statutory scheme over another in terms of lien perfection. As such,
the Florida Legislature should substantially amend Chapter 329 and
produce a cohesive set of aviation laws that reflects the competing
objectives and vulnerabilities of all parties involved in aviation lien
cases. Lawmakers have all the tools they need to accomplish this,
beginning and perhaps ending with the mechanic’s lien laws of
every state. While lawmakers need not—and should not—put the
policy decisions of other jurisdictions ahead of issues of particular
importance to Floridians and the state of Florida (which is itself a
uniquely important platform for aviation and aerospace), this Article
has shown that certain recurring issues arise in every aviation mechanic’s lien case and those issues should be packaged together in a
single standalone law, providing predictability and stability for creditors and debtors of aircraft.

APPENDIX
STATE

Alabama

AUTHORITY
FOR LIEN

Ala. Code
§ 35-11-110
(2021) and
Common
Law

POSSESSION FOR
PERFECTION?

HOW PERFECTED

Notice for Statutory Lien Possession for
Common Law
Lien

“Any . . . mechanic who
contributes his labor and
material . . . to the production, manufacture, or
repair of any vehicle [or]
machine . . . shall have a
lien thereon . . . with notice of such lien . . . .”
Ala. Code § 35-11-110
(2021). “Alabama is one
of the states which provides two mechanic’s
liens . . . . [T]he statutory
mechanic’s
lien . . . merely supplements, not supplants, the
common law mechanic’s
lien. The common law
lien is a possessory lien
and is lost by release of
the property. The statutory lien is not dependent upon maintaining
possession, but may be
perfected after release of
the property.” Peavy’s
Serv. Ctr., Inc. v. Assocs. Fin. Servs. Co.,
335 So. 2d 169, 170–71
(Ala. Civ. App. 1976)
(internal citations omitted).
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AUTHORITY
FOR LIEN

POSSESSION FOR
PERFECTION?

Alaska

Alaska Stat.
Ann.
§ 34.35.185
(West
2020).

Possession with
Recording

Arizona

Ariz. Rev.
Stat. Ann.
§ 331022(C)
(2021).

Recording after
Possession
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HOW PERFECTED

“The lien claimant shall,
before delivery of the
chattel to the owner or
the authorized agent of
the owner, record a lien
notice in the office of the
recorder of the recording
district where the chattel
is situated and in which
the labor, skill, and materials are expended on the
chattel.” Alaska Stat.
Ann.
§ 34.35.185(a)
(West 2020).
“If a proprietor has a lien
on an aircraft . . . the proprietor who provides labor, materials, supplies
and
storage
for aircraft may relinquish possession of the aircraft and
retain the lien by recording the lien with the
county recorder of the
county in which the labor, materials, supplies
or storage were provided.
The lien shall be filed
with the county recorder
within thirty days after
possession
is
relinquished.” Ariz. Rev. Stat.
Ann.
§ 33-1022(C)
(2021) (emphasis added).

2021]

STATE

Arkansas

NOTICE: AIRCRAFT LIEN LAW IN FLORIDA

AUTHORITY
FOR LIEN

POSSESSION FOR
PERFECTION?

1173

HOW PERFECTED

“If the lienholder has
voluntarily parted with
possession of any
property upon which
he or she has a lien under the provisions of
this subchapter, he or
she may still avail himself or herself of the
lien within one hunARK. CODE
Possession
or dred twenty (120) days
ANN. § 18Notice
(with after the work or labor
45-206
is done or performed or
Bond)
(2020).
materials
furnished . . . by
filing
with the clerk of the
circuit court . . . a just
and true itemized account for the demand
due . . . .” ARK. CODE
ANN.
§ 18-45-206
(a)(1)–(2) (2020).
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STATE

California

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

AUTHORITY
FOR LIEN

POSSESSION FOR
PERFECTION?

CAL. CIV.
PROC.
CODE
§§ 1208.61, Possession
1208.64
(Deering
2021).

[Vol. 75:1117

HOW PERFECTED

“[E]very person has a
lien dependent upon
possession for the
compensation
to
which is legally entitled for making repairs or performing
labor upon, and furnishing supplies or
materials for . . . any
aircraft . . . .” CAL.
CIV. PROC. CODE
§ 1208.61 (Deering
2021).
“Whenever the lien
upon any aircraft is
lost by reason of the
loss of possession
through trick, fraud,
or device, the repossession of such aircraft by the lienholder
revives the lien, but
the lien so revived is
subordinate to any
right, title, or interest
of any person under
any sale, transfer, encumbrance, lien, or
other interest acquired or secured in
good faith and for
value between the
time of the loss of
possession and the
time of repossession.”
CAL. CIV. PROC.
CODE
§ 1208.64
(Deering 2021).

2021]

STATE

Colorado

NOTICE: AIRCRAFT LIEN LAW IN FLORIDA

AUTHORITY
FOR LIEN

COLO.
REV.
STAT.
§ 38-20106
(2020).

POSSESSION FOR
PERFECTION?

Possession

1175

HOW PERFECTED

“Any mechanic or
other person who
makes, alters, repairs, or bestows labor upon any article
of personal property, at the request
of the owner of such
personal property or
his agent shall have
a lien upon such
property for the
amount due for such
labor done or material furnished and
for all costs incurred
in enforcing such
lien.” COLO. REV.
STAT. § 38-20-106
(2020); see also
Wenz v. McBride,
36 P. 1105, 1106
(Colo.
1894)
(“There must be a
possession of the
thing;
otherwise
there cannot, without special agreement to that effect,
be any lien.”).
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STATE

Connecticut

AUTHORITY
FOR LIEN

CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 4992g to -92k
(2019).
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POSSESSION
FOR

HOW PERFECTED

PERFECTION?

Possession
and Notice

“Any person who
stores, cares for,
maintains, repairs, or
furnishes any services, gasoline, accessories, materials, or
other supplies at the
request of or with the
consent of the owner,
his agent or legal possessor of an aircraft . . . has a lien
upon the aircraft until
the sum due for any
fees, expenses, or
charges . . . has been
paid. The lienor shall
be entitled to retain
possession of the aircraft
until
the
amount . . . has been
paid or the lien has
been
dissolved.”
CONN. GEN. STAT.
§ 49-92g (2019).
“Upon the possession
of the aircraft by a
lienor, he shall cause
a notice of an aircraft
lien, in duplicate, to
be filed on a form provided by the Secretary
of the State with the
office of the secretary . . . .”
CONN.
GEN. STAT § 4992h(a) (2019) (emphasis added).

2021]

STATE

Delaware

NOTICE: AIRCRAFT LIEN LAW IN FLORIDA

AUTHORITY
FOR LIEN

DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 25,
§3902
(2020).

1177

POSSESSION
FOR

HOW PERFECTED

PERFECTION?

Lienor must
file application
for lien sale or
file replevin
action within
ten days of loss
of possession

“In case, either before
or after the price or
reward become due
and payable, the
lienholder . . . loses
possession of the encumbered property,
except by court order
pursuant to this chapter, the lienholder’s
lien shall continue in
full force and effect,
provided that within
[ten] days from the
time of the loss of
possession
the
lienholder pursuant
to § 3903 of this title
files an application
for the issuance of an
authorization to conduct a lien sale or
files a counterclaim
for the sale of the encumbered property
pursuant to this chapter in a replevin action brought pursuant
to Chapter 95 of Title
10 by the owners or
other persons claiming an interest in the
property.”
DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 25,
§ 3902 (2020) (emphasis added).

1178

STATE

District of
Columbia

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

AUTHORITY
FOR LIEN

D.C. CODE
§ 40-307.01
(2021).

POSSESSION FOR
PERFECTION?

Possession

[Vol. 75:1117

HOW PERFECTED

“Any mechanic or artisan who shall make,
alter, or repair any article of personal property at the request of
the owner shall have
a lien thereon for his
just and reasonable
charges for his work
done and materials
furnished, and may
retain the same in his
possession until said
charges are paid; but
if possession is parted
with by his consent
such lien shall
cease.” D.C. CODE
§ 40-307.01 (2021)
(emphasis added).

2021]

STATE

Florida

NOTICE: AIRCRAFT LIEN LAW IN FLORIDA

AUTHORITY
FOR LIEN

FLA. STAT.
§§ 329.41,
329.51,
713.58
(2020).

1179

POSSESSION FOR
PERFECTION?

HOW PERFECTED

Recording
(within ninety
days of service)

“Any lien claimed on
an aircraft under [section] 329.41 or [section] 713.58 is enforceable when the
lienor records a verified lien notice with
the clerk of the circuit
court in the county
where the aircraft was
located at the time the
labor, services, fuel,
or material was last
furnished. The lienor
is not required to possess the aircraft to
perfect such lien. The
lienor must record
such lien notice
within [ninety] days
after the time the labor, services, fuel, or
material was last furnished.” FLA. STAT.
§ 329.51 (2020)

1180

STATE

Georgia

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

AUTHORITY
FOR LIEN

GA. CODE
ANN. §§ 4414-363, 4414-518
(2020).

POSSESSION FOR
PERFECTION?

Possession or
Notice

[Vol. 75:1117

HOW PERFECTED

“Such lien may be asserted by the retention of the aircraft or
aircraft engines, and
if such lien is asserted
by retention of the
aircraft or aircraft engines, the lienor shall
not be required to
surrender the aircraft
or the aircraft engine
to the holder of a subordinate security interest or lien. When
possession of the aircraft or aircraft engine is surrendered
by the person claiming the lien, the person claiming the lien
shall, within [ninety]
days after such repair, storage, service,
supplies, accessories,
or contracts of indemnity are furnished [provide written notice of the details of the debt and
airplane at issue, including its owners].”
GA. CODE ANN.
§ 44-14-518(b)
(2020).
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STATE

Hawaii

Idaho

NOTICE: AIRCRAFT LIEN LAW IN FLORIDA

AUTHORITY
FOR LIEN

1181

POSSESSION
FOR

HOW PERFECTED

PERFECTION?

HAW. REV.
STAT. ANN.
§ 507-18
(LexisNexis
2020).

Possession

IDAHO
CODE § 451101 to 1102
(2020).

Possessory (if
written estimate provided
before Labor)and NonPossessory
(with written
contract and
notice)

“A person who makes, alters, or repairs any article of
personal property at the request of the owner of the
property, shall have a lien
on the property for the reasonable charges for the
work done and materials
furnished, excluding storage charges, and may retain
possession of the property
until the charges are
paid . . . .” HAW. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 507-18 (LexisNexis 2020) (emphasis
added).
“Any person . . . who expends labor, skill, or material upon an aircraft . . . has
a special lien, dependent
upon possession, on the aircraft for the just and reasonable charges for the labor
performed and material furnished up to the amount of
the written estimate or subsequent oral written modifications thereto.” IDAHO
CODE § 45-1101(1) (2020).
The lien “[i]s not dependent
upon possession by the repairperson” provided the
lien is recorded with the
FAA aircraft registry and is
a created by written contract
between the parties. IDAHO
CODE § 45-1102 (2020).
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STATE

Illinois

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

AUTHORITY
FOR LIEN

770 ILL.
COMP.
STAT. ANN.
§§ 45/1,
45/2 (LexisNexis
2020).
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POSSESSION
FOR

HOW PERFECTED

PERFECTION?

Recording
(within sixty
days of relinquishment of
possession)

“Every person . . . who has
expended labor, skill or materials upon any chattel, or
has furnished storage for
said chattel, at the request of
its owner, reputed owner, or
authorized agent of the
owner, or lawful possessor
thereof, shall have a lien
upon such chattel beginning
on the date of the commencement of such expenditure . . . for a period of
one year from and after the
completion of such expenditure . . . notwithstanding the
fact that the possession of
such chattel has been surrendered to the owner, or lawful
possessor thereof.” 770 ILL.
COMP.
STAT.
ANN.
§ 45/1(LexisNexis 2020).
“Such lien shall cease at the
expiration of [sixty] days
from the date of the delivery
of such chattel to the owner
thereof, or his duly authorized agent, unless the lien
claimant shall within 60
days, file in the office of the
recorder of the county in
which the labor, skill and
materials were expended on
such chattel, or storage furnished for such chattel, a
lien notice . . . .” 770 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. § 45/2
(LexisNexis 2020).

2021]

STATE

NOTICE: AIRCRAFT LIEN LAW IN FLORIDA

AUTHORITY
FOR LIEN

1183

POSSESSION
FOR

HOW PERFECTED

PERFECTION?

Indiana

IND. CODE
§ 32-33-106 (2020).

Recording

Iowa

IOWA CODE
§ 577.1
(2021).

Possession

“A person seeking to acquire a lien upon . . . an
airplane . . . whether the
claim to be secured by the
lien is then due or not,
must file in the recorder’s
office the county where
[the repair service was
performed] . . . a notice
in writing of the intention
to hold the lien upon
the . . . airplane.”
IND.
CODE § 32-33-106(a)(1)–(2) (2020) (emphasis added).
“Any person who renders
any service or furnishes
any material in the making, repairing, improving,
or enhancing the value of
any inanimate personal
property, with the assent
of the owner, express or
implied, shall have a lien
thereon for the agreed or
reasonable compensation
for the service and material while such property is
lawfully in the person’s
possession, which possession the person may
retain until such compensation is paid . . . .” IOWA
CODE § 577.1 (2021)
(emphasis added).
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STATE

Kansas

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

AUTHORITY
FOR LIEN

KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 58201 (2020).
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POSSESSION
FOR

HOW PERFECTED

PERFECTION?

Possession or
Recording

“If such property shall
come into the lien claimant’s possession for the
purpose of having the
work, repairs or improvements made or the equipment replaced, added or
installed thereon, such
lien shall be valid as long
as the lien claimant retains possession of the
property, and the claimant of the lien may retain
the same after parting
with the possession of the
property by filing within
[ninety] days in the office
of the register of deeds,
under oath, a statement of
the items of the account
and a description of the
property on which the
lien is claimed . . . .”
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58201 (2020) (emphasis
added).
“If the lien claimant was
never in possession of the
property, the lien claimant may retain the lien by
filing, within [ninety]
days after the date upon
which work was last performed . . . .” Id.

2021]

STATE

Kentucky

NOTICE: AIRCRAFT LIEN LAW IN FLORIDA

AUTHORITY
FOR LIEN

KY. REV.
STAT. ANN.
§ 376.270
(LexisNexis
2020).
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POSSESSION
FOR

HOW PERFECTED

PERFECTION?

Possession or
Recording
following
Possession

“Any person engaged in
the business of selling,
repairing or furnishing
accessories or supplies
for motor vehicles shall
have a lien on the motor
vehicle for the reasonable
or
agreed
charges . . . and may detain any motor vehicle
in his possession on
which work has been
done by him until the
reasonable or agreed
charge therefor has been
paid. The lien shall not
be lost by the removal of
the motor vehicle from
the garage or premises
of the person performing labor, repairing or
furnishing accessories
or supplies therefor, if
the lien shall be asserted within six (6)
months by filing in the
office of the county clerk
a statement showing the
amount and cost of materials furnished or labor performed on the
vehicle.” KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 376.270
(LexisNexis 2020) (emphasis added).
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STATE

Louisiana

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

AUTHORITY
FOR LIEN

LA. STAT.
ANN.
§ 9:4512
(2020).
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POSSESSION
FOR

HOW PERFECTED

PERFECTION?

Possession or
Recording

“Any person claiming a
privilege on an aircraft . . . may record the
privilege on the aircraft
by filing a notice or a
claim with the Federal
Aviation Administration
– Aircraft Registry not
later than the ninetieth
day after the labor, services, fuel, and materials
were furnished.” LA.
STAT.
ANN.
§ 9:4512(A)(1) (2020).
“[W]hen the aircraft remains in the possession of
the privilege holder, and
the debt due thereon remains unpaid for more
than ninety days from the
date on which the last labor
was
performed . . . the holder of
such privilege may sell
such property at private
sale and without appraisement, after advertising
such property for ten days
as provided by law in case
of judicial sale of movables.” LA. STAT. ANN.
§ 9:4512(B) (2020).
“The privilege holder
may retain possession of
the aircraft subject to the
privilege until the amount
due is paid in full.” LA.
STAT. ANN. § 9:4512(C)
(2020).

2021]

STATE

NOTICE: AIRCRAFT LIEN LAW IN FLORIDA

AUTHORITY
FOR LIEN

1187

POSSESSION
FOR

HOW PERFECTED

PERFECTION?

Maine

ME. REV.
STAT.
ANN. tit.
10,
§§ 3801–
02 (2019).

Notice

Maryland

MD. CODE
ANN.,
COM. LAW
§§ 16-203,
-204 (West
2021).

Notice

A lien is dissolved unless
the claimant files a financing statement with the Secretary of State within 90
days after such labor is performed or such materials
are furnished. ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 3801
(2019).“Said lien shall be
dissolved if said property
has actually changed ownership prior to such filing.”
Id.
“The lienor may retain possession of the property until: (1) The charges which
give rise to the lien are
paid; or (2) The lien is otherwise
discharged . . . . [T]he lienor
shall send notice of the lien
by registered or certified
mail to all holders of perfected security interests in
the property . . . .” MD.
CODE ANN., COM. LAW
§ 16-203(a)–(b)
(West
2021).
“Surrender or delivery of
the property subject to the
lien discharges that lien
against a third person who
is without notice of the
lien, but does not discharge
the lien against the owner
or against a third party who
has notice of the lien.” MD.
CODE ANN., COM. LAW
§ 16-204 (West 2021).
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STATE

Massachusetts

AUTHORITY
FOR LIEN

MASS.
GEN. LAWS
ch. 255,
§ 31E
(2019).
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POSSESSION
FOR

HOW PERFECTED

PERFECTION?

Recording
Dispositive

“Any person entitled
to a lien under this
section, shall within
sixty days after last
furnishing of labor,
money, material or
supplies for the production of, altering or
repairing of said personal property, file in
the office of the federal aviation administration aircraft registry, a statement in
writing verified by
oath, showing the
amount of labor,
money, material or
supplies furnished for
the producing, storage, parking, servicing, altering or repairing of said personal
property, the name of
the person for, and by
whom labor, money,
material or supplies,
was furnished, and
specifying the registration number of said
aircraft. Unless the
person entitled to such
lien shall file such
statement within the
time aforesaid, he
shall be deemed to
have waived his rights
thereto . . . .” MASS.
GEN. LAWS ch. 255,
§ 31E (2019).

2021]

STATE

Michigan

NOTICE: AIRCRAFT LIEN LAW IN FLORIDA

AUTHORITY
FOR LIEN

MICH.
COMP.
LAWS
ANN.
§§ 259.205
-.205b
(West
2020).
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POSSESSION
FOR

HOW PERFECTED

PERFECTION?

Possession
(up to ninety
days) or else
File Claim of
Lien with
FAA within
60 days of
last work

“The garage keeper may
detain the aircraft at any
time it is his or her possession within [ninety] days
after performing the last labor or furnishing the last
supplies for which the lien
is claimed.” MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 259.205
(West 2020).
“If charges . . . for an aircraft are not paid within
[sixty] days after a claim of
lien together with an itemized statement of the account is delivered to the
registered owner of the aircraft by personal service or
service by registered or
certified mail addressed
[and recorded with the Federal Aviation Administration] . . . the garage keeper
may sell the aircraft at public auction.” MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN § 259.205b(1)
(West 2020).
“The garage keeper’s lien
established in this act is the
sole lien available to a garage keeper as to an aircraft,
and the common law garage keeper’s lien as to aircraft is abolished.” MICH.
COMP.
LAWS
ANN
§259.205a(3) (West 2020).
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STATE

AUTHORITY
FOR LIEN
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POSSESSION
FOR

HOW PERFECTED

PERFECTION?

Mississippi

MISS.
CODE ANN.
§§ 85-7101, 85-7105, 85-7107 (2020).

Notice

Missouri

MO. REV.
STAT.
§ 430.020
(2020).

Filing a
statement after relinquishing
possession

“If
the
lienholders . . . part with possession of the property, they
shall retain their liens
while the property remains in the hands of the
owner, or one deriving title or possession through
him, with notice that the
price of the labor and materials . . . was unpaid,
and may enforce the same
in like manner as is provided in Sections 85-731 and 85-7-53.” MISS.
CODE ANN. § 85-7-105
(2020) (emphasis added).
“[T]he person furnishing
the labor or material on
the aircraft or part or
equipment thereof may
retain the lien after surrendering possession of
the aircraft or part or
equipment thereof by filing a statement in the office of the county recorder of the county
where the owner of the
aircraft or part or equipment thereof resides, if
known to the claimant,
and in the office of the
county recorder of the
county where the labor or
material was furnished.”
MO.
REV.
STAT.
§ 430.020 (2020) (emphasis added).

2021]

STATE

Montana

NOTICE: AIRCRAFT LIEN LAW IN FLORIDA

AUTHORITY
FOR LIEN

MONT.
CODE ANN.
§ 71-31201
(2019).

1191

POSSESSION
FOR

HOW PERFECTED

PERFECTION?

Possession

“A person who, while
lawfully in possession of
an article of personal
property, renders any service to the owner or lawful claimant of the article
by labor or skill employed for the making,
repairing, protection, [or]
improvement . . . of the
article . . . has a special
lien on the article. The
lien is dependent on possession . . . .”
MONT.
CODE ANN. § 71-31201(2)(a) (2019). (emphasis added).
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STATE

Nebraska

AUTHORITY
FOR LIEN

NEB. REV.
STAT. § 52202 (2020).
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POSSESSION
FOR

HOW PERFECTED

PERFECTION?

Perfection
under Uniform Commercial Code

“Any person who makes,
alters, repairs, or in any
way enhances the value
of any vehicle, automobile, machinery, or farm
implement or tool or
shoes any horse or mule,
at the request of or with
the consent of the owner
or owners thereof, has a
lien upon such property,
in cases when he or she
has parted with the possession of such property,
for his or her reasonable
or agreed charges for the
work performed or material furnished. A lien created under this section
shall be perfected as provided in article 9, Uniform Commercial Code.
Any financing statement
filed to perfect such lien
shall be filed within sixty
days after performing
such work . . . .” (emphasis added). NEB. REV.
STAT. § 52-202 (2020).
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STATE

Nevada

NOTICE: AIRCRAFT LIEN LAW IN FLORIDA

AUTHORITY
FOR LIEN

NEV. REV.
STAT.
§§ 108.272,
.280 (2020)

1193

POSSESSION
FOR

HOW PERFECTED

PERFECTION?

Notice

“Any person who acquires a lien under the
provisions of [section]
108.270 does not lose
the lien by allowing
the . . . aircraft . . . or
aircraft
equipment . . . or
parts
thereof to be removed
from control of the person having the lien.”
NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 108.280 (2020).
Lienor must “(a) within
120 days after the person furnishes supplies
or services; or (b)
within [seven] days after the person receives
an order to release the
property,
whichever
time is less, serve the
legal owner by mailing
a copy of the notice of
the lien to the owner’s
last known address, or
if no address is known,
by leaving a copy with
the clerk of the court in
the county where the
notice is filed.” NEV.
REV. STAT. § 108.272
(2020).
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STATE

New
Hampshire

AUTHORITY
FOR LIEN

N.H. REV.
STAT.
ANN.
§ 450:2
(2020).

POSSESSION FOR
PERFECTION?

Possession

[Vol. 75:1117

HOW PERFECTED

“Any person who
shall, by himself or
others, perform labor,
furnish materials, or
expend money, in repairing, refitting or
equipping any motor
vehicle or aircraft, under a contract expressed or implied
with the legal or equitable owner, shall have
a lien upon such motor
vehicle or aircraft, so
long as the same shall
remain in his possession, until the charges
for such repairs, materials, or accessories, or
money so used or expended have been
paid.” N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 450:2
(2020)
(emphasis
added).

2021]

STATE

New
Jersey

NOTICE: AIRCRAFT LIEN LAW IN FLORIDA

AUTHORITY
FOR LIEN

N.J. STAT.
ANN.
§ 2A:44-2,
44-3 (West
2020).
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POSSESSION
FOR

HOW PERFECTED

PERFECTION?

Filing Statement

“Any person, engaged in the business of . . . maintenance, keeping
or repairing of aircraft . . . shall
have a lien upon such aircraft . . . and may, without process
of law, detain such aircraft at any
time it is lawfully in his possession
until such sum is paid.” N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2A:44-2(a) (West 2020).
“Any person entitled to a lien pursuant to subsection a. [of § 2A:442] shall, within [ninety] days after
the date upon which work was last
performed or material last furnished in performing such work or
making such repairs or improvements, or fees were last incurred
for landings or take-offs, file in the
office of the county recording officer of the county in which the aircraft is based, or where the work
was performed or material supplied, or landing and take-off fees
incurred, a statement verified by
oath.” N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:442(b) (West 2020).
“A person acquiring a lien under section 2A:44-2 of this title
shall not lose the same by reason
of allowing the aircraft, or part
thereof, to be removed from his
control, and if so removed, he may,
after demand of payment of claim
either personally or by registered
mail if the owner’s address is
known, and without further process of law, seize without force and
in a peaceable manner, the aircraft
or part thereof, wherever found in
this state.” N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2A:44-3 (West 2020) (emphasis
added).
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STATE

New
Mexico

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

AUTHORITY
FOR LIEN

N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 48-3-29
(West 2021).
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POSSESSION
FOR

HOW PERFECTED

PERFECTION?

Filing Statement (with or
without possession, but
possessory
lien has priority)

“The possessory lien shall
have priority over all other
liens, including recorded
liens on the aircraft, except
liens for taxes . . . .” N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 48-3-29(A)
(West
2021) (emphasis
added).
“Any person entitled to a
lien . . . shall, within ninety
days after the date on which
labor was last performed or
materials, supplies or services
were last furnished, file in the
office of the county clerk of
the county in which the aircraft is based, or where the labor was performed or materials, supplies or services
[were] furnished, a statement
verified by oath.” N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 48-3-29(D) (West
2021).
“The lien perfected pursuant
to Subsection D of this section may be enforced against
the aircraft, whether or not in
the possession of the
lienholder, by judgment of
the court having jurisdiction
in the county where the lien is
filed and a writ of execution
pursuant to that judgment.
The court may, in its discretion, award reasonable attorney’s fees to the prevailing
party.” N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 48-3-29(E) (West 2021).

2021]

STATE

New
York

NOTICE: AIRCRAFT LIEN LAW IN FLORIDA

AUTHORITY
FOR LIEN

N.Y. LIEN
LAW § 184
(McKinney
2021).
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POSSESSION
FOR

HOW PERFECTED

PERFECTION?

No, but lien
is void if
possession is
relinquished
after thirty
days from
accrual

“A person . . . [who] maintains, keeps or repairs . . . aircraft or furnishes gasoline or other
supplies therefor . . . has a
lien . . . for
the
sum
due . . . and may detain
such . . . aircraft at any
time it may be lawfully in
his possession until such
sum is paid, except that if
the lienor, subsequent to
thirty days from the accrual of such lien, allows
the aircraft out of his actual possession the lien
provided for in this section
shall thereupon become
void as against all security
interests, whether or not
perfected, in such . . . aircraft and executed prior to
the accrual of such lien,
notwithstanding possession of such . . . aircraft is
thereafter acquired by such
lienor.” N.Y. LIEN LAW
§ 184(1) (McKinney 2021)
(emphasis added).
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STATE

North
Carolina

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

AUTHORITY
FOR LIEN

N.C. GEN.
STAT.
§§ 44A-55, 60 (2020).
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POSSESSION FOR
PERFECTION?

HOW PERFECTED

No, but lien is
void if possession is relinquished 120 days
from surrender
of property unless notice of lien
is filed

“The lien under this
section survives even
if the possession of
the aircraft is surrendered by the lienor.”
N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 44A-55 (2020).
“The lien . . . expires
120 days after the
date the lienor voluntarily
surrenders
possession of the aircraft, unless the
lienor, prior to the
expiration of the 120day period, files a
notice of lien in the
office of the clerk of
court of the county in
which the labor, skill,
or materials were expended on the aircraft, or the storage
was furnished for the
aircraft.” N.C. GEN.
STAT.
§ 44A-60
(2020)
(emphasis
added).

2021]

STATE

North
Dakota

NOTICE: AIRCRAFT LIEN LAW IN FLORIDA

AUTHORITY
FOR LIEN

N.D. CENT.
CODE § 3513-02 (2019).

POSSESSION FOR
PERFECTION?

Possession or,
absent possession file a statement of claim

1199

HOW PERFECTED

“A person entitled to
a lien . . . who retains
possession of the
property made, altered, or repaired is
not required to file
any statement to perfect the lien. If the
possession of the
property made, altered, or repaired is
relinquished, the person shall file electronically,
within
ninety days . . . after
the materials are furnished or the labor is
completed, in the
central indexing system, a statement
showing: (a) the labor performed[,] (b)
the materials furnished[,] (c) the price
agreed . . . .”
N.D.
CENT. CODE § 3513-02(1) (2019).

1200

STATE

Ohio

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

AUTHORITY
FOR LIEN

OHIO REV.
CODE ANN.
§§ 1311.72–
.73 (LexisNexis
2020).
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POSSESSION
FOR

HOW PERFECTED

PERFECTION?

Filing
Affidavit

“[A]ny person who performs labor
upon or furnishes materials for an aircraft has a lien upon the aircraft to secure payment for the labor and materials. [However,] no person shall have
a lien . . . if the person has possession
of the aircraft or if the cost of the labor
performed or materials furnished for
the aircraft is greater than or equal to
one thousand dollars and the owner of
the aircraft has not requested or consented to the performance of the labor
or furnishing of the materials.” OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 1311.72(A)–(B)
(LexisNexis 2020).“To perfect a lien
that arises under section 1311.72 of
the Revised Code, the person claiming
the lien shall make and file for record
with the United States federal aviation
administration an affidavit verified
under oath that includes the amount
owed to the lien claimant for the labor
or materials, a description of the aircraft that reasonably identifies it including the manufacturer, model, serial number, and registration number
of the aircraft, the name of the person
for whom the labor was performed or
the materials were furnished, the
name of the owner of the aircraft, if
known, the name and address of the
lien claimant, the date that the lien
claimant or his employee last performed any labor upon or furnished
any materials for the aircraft, the date
that the lien claimant surrendered possession of the aircraft, if he surrendered it, and the name and address of
the person who prepared the affidavit.” OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 1311.73(A) (LexisNexis 2020) (emphasis added).
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STATE

Oklahoma

NOTICE: AIRCRAFT LIEN LAW IN FLORIDA

AUTHORITY
FOR LIEN

OKLA.
STAT. tit.
42 §§ 97–
98 (2021).
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POSSESSION
FOR

HOW PERFECTED

PERFECTION?

Filing

“[A]ny person entitled to
a lien pursuant to this
chapter shall within one
hundred twenty (120)
days after last furnishing
of labor, money, material
or supplies for the production of, altering or repairing of said personal property, file in the office of
the county clerk of the
county in which the property is situated a statement
in writing verified by
oath, showing the amount
of labor, money, material
or supplies furnished for
the producing of, altering
or repairing of said personal property, the name
of the person for, and by
whom labor, money, material or supplies, was furnished.” OKLA. STAT. tit.
42 § 98(A)(1) (2021).
“If the person entitled
to such lien does not file
such statement within the
time required by this
chapter, such person shall
be deemed to have waived
his rights thereto.” OKLA.
STAT. tit. 42 § 98(A)(1)
(2021).
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STATE

Oregon

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

AUTHORITY FOR
LIEN

OR. REV. STAT.
§ 87.152 (2020)
(possessory) OR.
REV. STAT.
§§ 87.216, .242,
.252 (2020)
(non-possessory)

POSSESSION FOR
PERFECTION?

Notice

[Vol. 75:1117

HOW PERFECTED

Non-possessory
liens: file written
notice of claim of
lien not later than
60 days after the
close of the furnishing of the labor, services, or
materials.
OR.
REV.
STAT.
§ 87.242(1).
Lienor must also
send “forthwith” a
copy of the notice
to the owner of the
chattel.
Id.
§ 87.252.

2021]

NOTICE: AIRCRAFT LIEN LAW IN FLORIDA

STATE

Pennsylvania

AUTHORITY
FOR LIEN

6 PA. CONS.
STAT. AND
CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 11
(West
2021).

1203

POSSESSION
FOR

HOW PERFECTED

PERFECTION?

Notice while
in Possession

“Hereafter where any
person, corporation,
firm, or copartnership
may have what is
known as a ‘common
law lien’ for work
done or material furnished about the repair
of any personal property belonging to another person, corporation, firm, or copartnership, it shall be
lawful for such person,
corporation, firm, or
copartnership having
said common law lien,
while such property is
in the hands of the said
person, corporation,
firm, or copartnership
contributing
such
work and material, to
give notice in writing
to the owner of the
amount of indebtedness for which said
common law lien is
claimed.” 6 PA. CONS.
STAT. AND
CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 11
(West 2021) (emphasis added).

1204

STATE

Rhode
Island

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

AUTHORITY
FOR LIEN

R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 3447-3 (2020).
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POSSESSION
FOR

HOW PERFECTED

PERFECTION?

Filing

“Any person entitled to a
lien under this section
shall, within sixty (60)
days after last furnishing
of labor, money, material, or supplies for the
production of, altering,
or repairing of the personal property, file in the
office of the federal aviation administration aircraft registry a statement
in writing verified by
oath showing the amount
of labor, money, material, or supplies furnished
for the producing, storage, parking, servicing,
altering, or repairing of
the personal property, the
name of the person for,
and by whom labor,
money, material, or supplies, was furnished, and
specifying the registration number of the aircraft. Unless the person
entitled to the lien files
the statement within the
time provided in this section, he or she is deemed
to have waived his or her
rights to the lien.” R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 34-47-3
(2020)
(emphasis
added).
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STATE

South
Carolina

NOTICE: AIRCRAFT LIEN LAW IN FLORIDA

AUTHORITY
FOR LIEN

S.C.
CODE ANN.
§ 29-15-100
(2020).

POSSESSION FOR
PERFECTION?

Filing Dispositive

1205

HOW PERFECTED

“Such lien shall be
dissolved unless the
person claiming it
shall file, within
ninety days after such
service, supplies, accessories or contracts
of indemnity are furnished, in the office of
the register of deeds
or clerk of court of the
county within which
the aircraft was located at the time such
service, supplies, accessories or contracts
of indemnity were
furnished, a statement, subscribed and
sworn to by himself or
by some person in his
behalf, giving a just
and true account of
the
demands
claimed . . . .”
S.C.
CODE ANN. § 29-15100(a) (2020).

1206

STATE

South
Dakota

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

AUTHORITY
FOR LIEN

S.D.
CODIFIED
LAWS § 4411-3 (2021).

POSSESSION FOR
PERFECTION?

Notice

[Vol. 75:1117

HOW PERFECTED

“Notwithstanding the
voluntary surrender
or other loss of possession of the property on which such
lien is claimed, the
person
entitled
thereto may preserve
such lien, if at any
time within one hundred twenty days after
such surrender or loss
of possession he gives
notice of his lien by
proper filing thereof
in the office of the
register of deeds in accordance with §§ 442-3 to 44-2-9, inclusive, and such liens
shall be valid against
everyone except a
purchaser or encumbrancer in good faith,
without notice, and
for value whose rights
were acquired prior to
the filing of such
statement.”
S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 4411-3 (2021) (emphasis
added).
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STATE

Tennessee

NOTICE: AIRCRAFT LIEN LAW IN FLORIDA

AUTHORITY
FOR LIEN

TENN. CODE
ANN. § 6619-301
(2020).

POSSESSION FOR
PERFECTION?

Filing

1207

HOW PERFECTED

“A lien against any
type of conveyance
used in the transportation of persons or
merchandise through
the air, propelled by
any sort of power, asserted
pursuant
to § 66-19-101, shall
be filed with the register for the county in
which the actions
giving rise to the lien
occurred,
within
ninety (90) days after
the work is finished
or repairs made or
materials furnished.”
TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 66-19-301(a)
(2020).
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STATE

Texas

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

AUTHORITY
FOR LIEN

TEX. PROP.
CODE
ANN.
§§ 70.301–
.303 (West
2019).
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POSSESSION
FOR

HOW PERFECTED

PERFECTION?

Recording

“A holder of a lien under this
subchapter may retain possession of the aircraft subject to the
lien until the amount due is
paid.” TEX. PROP. CODE ANN.
§ 70.302(a) (West 2019).
“[I]f the holder of a lien under
this subchapter relinquishes
possession of the aircraft before
the amount due is paid, the person may retake possession of
the aircraft as provided by Section 9.609, Business & Commerce Code. The holder of a
lien under this subchapter may
not retake possession of the aircraft from a bona fide purchaser
for value who purchases the aircraft without knowledge of the
lien before the date of the lien is
recorded . . . .” TEX. PROP.
CODE ANN. § 70.302(b)–(c)
(West 2019).
“A holder of a lien under this
subchapter may record the lien
on the aircraft by filing with the
Federal Aviation Administration Aircraft Registry not later
than the 180th day after the date
of the completion of the contractual storage period or the
performance of the last repair
or maintenance a verified document in the form and manner
required by applicable federal
laws and regulations . . . .”
TEX. PROP. CODE ANN.
§ 70.303 (West 2019).
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STATE

Utah

NOTICE: AIRCRAFT LIEN LAW IN FLORIDA

AUTHORITY
FOR LIEN

UTAH CODE
ANN. § 3813-201 (LexisNexis
2021).

1209

POSSESSION
FOR

HOW PERFECTED

PERFECTION?

Notice

“A repairman may retain possession of the
aircraft
until
the
amount due under
Subsection (1) is paid,
subject to the rights
and interests of any secured party in the aircraft that has priority
in
accordance
with Section 38-13205 over the lien imposed under this chapter unless the secured
party requested that
the repairman make,
alter, repair, or perform labor on the aircraft.” UTAH CODE
ANN. § 38-13-201(2)
(LexisNexis 2021).
“For a lien to be valid,
a repairman shall file
the lien with the Federal Aviation Administration
within
[ninety] days of the
last day on which the
repairman makes, alters, repairs, or performs labor on the aircraft.” UTAH CODE
ANN.
§ 38-13201(3)(a) (LexisNexis
2021).

1210

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

STATE

AUTHORITY
FOR LIEN

Vermont

VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 9,
§ 1951
(2020).

Virginia

VA.
CODE ANN.
§ 43-34.1
(2020).
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POSSESSION
FOR

HOW PERFECTED

PERFECTION?

Possession

Filing

“A person who makes,
alters . . . or repairs an
article of personal
property, at the request
of the owner, shall
have a lien thereon for
his or her reasonable
charges and may retain
possession of the property until the same are
paid.” VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 9, § 1951 (2020).
“The claim of lien
shall be signed, under
oath, by the claimant,
his agent or attorney[.]
The claim of lien shall
also be filed within
120 days after completion of alterations or
repair . . . with
the
State
Corporation
Commission . . . . The
claim of lien shall also
be filed within such
120-day period with
the Aircraft Registration Branch of the
Federal Aviation Administration.”
VA.
CODE ANN. § 43-34.1
(2020).
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NOTICE: AIRCRAFT LIEN LAW IN FLORIDA

STATE

AUTHORITY
FOR LIEN
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POSSESSION
FOR

HOW PERFECTED

PERFECTION?

Washington

WASH.
REV. CODE
ANN.
§ 60.08.020
(West
2021).

Filing
Dispositive

West
Virginia

W. VA.
CODE § 3811-3
(2020).

Possession

“In order to make such
lien effectual, the lien
claimant shall, within
ninety days from the
date of delivery of such
chattel to the owner,
file in the office of the
auditor of the county in
which such chattel is
kept, a lien notice . . . .” WASH. REV.
CODE
§ 60.08.020
(2020).
“A person who, while
in possession thereof,
makes, alters, repairs,
stores, transports or in
any way enhances the
value of an article of
personal property . . .
shall have a lien upon
such article . . . while
lawfully in the possession thereof, for the
charges agreed upon,
or, if no charges be
agreed upon, then for
his just and reasonable
charges for the work
done . . . to the extent
and in the manner provided for in section
fourteen of this article,
and may retain possession thereof until such
charges are paid.” W.
VA. CODE § 38-11-3
(2020)
(emphasis
added).
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UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

STATE

Wisconsin

AUTHORITY
FOR LIEN
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POSSESSION
FOR

HOW PERFECTED

PERFECTION?

WIS. STAT. Possession or
§ 779.413(3 Notice and Fil) (2020).
ing

“A lien under this section may be asserted
by the retention of
the aircraft or the aircraft engine, and if
the lien is asserted by
retention of the aircraft or aircraft engine, the lienor may
not be required to surrender
the aircraft or aircraft engine
to the holder of a subordinate security interest or lien. If possession of the aircraft or aircraft engine
is surrendered by the
person claiming the
lien, the person claiming the lien may do all
of
the
following
within 180 days after
the repairs, storage,
services, supplies, accessories, or contracts
of indemnity are furnished: [ ] Provide
written notice . . . giving an accurate account of the demands
claimed
to
be
due . . . .” WIS. STAT.
§ 779.413(3) (2020).

2021]

STATE

NOTICE: AIRCRAFT LIEN LAW IN FLORIDA

AUTHORITY
FOR LIEN

WYO.
STAT. ANN.
Wyoming § 29-7-102
(West
2020).

1213

POSSESSION
FOR

HOW PERFECTED

PERFECTION?

Possession
(up to 6
months) or
else filing
before Releasing Possession

“A lien claimant may retain
possession of the property
to which the lien pertains
until paid for the labor, services, materials and feed
which entitle the lien claimant to assert the lien. However, the right of possession
terminates six (6) months
after the date upon which
the charges become due and
payable unless the lien
claimant has commenced
proceedings to foreclose
the lien . . . .” WYO. STAT.
ANN. § 29-7-102(a) (West
2020).
“If a lien claimant desires to
continue a lien without retaining possession, he may
before voluntarily releasing possession file a lien
statement in the office of
the county clerk of the
county where the property
is located . . . .” WYO.
STAT. ANN. § 29-7-102(c)
(West 2020).
“If possession is terminated
without the lien claimant’s
consent, he may perfect the
lien by filing a lien statement on or before thirty
(30) days after possession
is terminated.” WYO. STAT.
ANN. § 29-7-102(d) (West
2020).

